2008年1月25日金曜日

北朝鮮の国連支援事業悪用報告書を公開

北朝鮮の国連支援事業悪用報告書が公開された。
米上院調査小委員会は「北朝鮮が国連開発計画(UNDP)の支援事業を悪用したと
する報告書」を公表した。

1.国連の監査報告書で、現地職員の給与が北朝鮮政府に直接、外貨で支払われ
 ていた
2.UNDPは不適切な会計管理などの問題がある
3.朝鮮貿易銀行の口座を使い、BDAの口座に計272万ドルを送金
4.通常兵器や弾道ミサイルの売買に関与する団体と結びつきがあるとしている
 中国企業に対し、UNDPが知らずに約5万ドルを送金

北朝鮮に対する評価が政府と議会で違うことを明確にするために、報告書を公開
したと思うけど、ブッシュが暴走しないように思いとどまらせる資料となるかは
わからない。任期満了間際で急いでいるようにも見える。

ペリーノが「指定解除を明確に否定」と言うけど、香港寄航問題の発言のように、
正反対になる場合がある。


---UNDPの監督不備批判 北朝鮮流用疑惑で米大使---
産経新聞 2008.1.25 11:17
http://sankei.jp.msn.com/world/america/080125/amr0801251116008-n1.htm

 ハリルザド米国連大使は24日、米上院の調査小委員会公聴会で証言し、北朝鮮が国連開発計画(UNDP)支援事業を「悪用した」とする報告書を同委がまとめたことについて、UNDPの監督体制に不備があったと批判した。
 報告書によると、ブッシュ米大統領が2002年の一般教書演説で北朝鮮を「悪の枢軸」の一角と名指ししたため、北朝鮮は海外の大使館への送金が制限されかねないとの懸念を抱いた。
 このため、平壌の朝鮮貿易銀行にあるUNDP支援事業費の受け皿口座から送金すれば「より安全」と判断。マカオの銀行バンコ・デルタ・アジア(BDA)の口座に同年、計272万ドル(約2億9000万円)の自国資金を移管した。
 ハリルザド大使は「移管されたのはUNDP資金ではなく、北朝鮮の自国資金」という報告書の結論を追認。北朝鮮が支援事業費を不正流用したとの疑惑の解明には至らなかった。
 疑惑は現在、ハンガリーのネーメト元首相が率いる作業チームが調査中。大使によると、今年3月には調査結果がまとまる見通しという。(共同)


---北朝鮮がUNDPの支援事業悪用、米上院が報告書---
2008年1月24日20時16分 読売新聞
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/world/news/20080124-OYT1T00509.htm

 【ワシントン=宮崎健雄】米上院調査小委員会は23日、北朝鮮が国連開発計画(UNDP)の支援事業を悪用していたとする報告書を公表した。
 報告書によると、北朝鮮は、ブッシュ米大統領が2002年1月の一般教書演説で北朝鮮などを「悪の枢軸」と批判したのを受け、金融制裁で海外送金ができなくなると懸念。国際社会の監視の目を逃れるため、主にUNDPから支援事業費用を受け取るために使用していた朝鮮貿易銀行の口座を使い、02年4~9月にマカオの金融機関バンコ・デルタ・アジア(BDA)の口座に計272万ドルを送金した。
 報告書はまた、米国が通常兵器や弾道ミサイルの売買に関与する団体と結びつきがあるとしている企業に対し、UNDPが知らずに約5万ドルを送金した事例があったとも指摘。「不適切な会計管理などの問題がある」とUNDPを批判した上で、「北朝鮮政府はUNDPの事業を都合のいいように利用していた」と結論づけた。
 UNDPの北朝鮮支援事業は、「北朝鮮政府が支援資金を核開発などに流用している恐れがある」と米国などが指摘したため、07年3月以降は停止されている。
 国連の監査機関は07年6月の監査報告書で、現地職員の給与が北朝鮮政府に直接、外貨で支払われていた実態を確認したが、給与や事務所経費の最終的な使い道などは追跡できず、流用疑惑の究明には至っていない。このため、米議会も昨年から調査を進めていた。


---北が援助資金を不正流用か 米議会で報告---
産経新聞 2008.1.24 19:04
http://sankei.jp.msn.com/world/america/080124/amr0801241904016-n1.htm

 【ニューヨーク=長戸雅子】北朝鮮が国連開発計画(UNDP)などの援助資金を流用していたとの疑惑を調べていた米上院の調査小委員会は22日、北朝鮮が援助事業を悪用し、2002年には国連の関連口座から総額約270万ドルを国外の北朝鮮外交施設あてに送金していたなどの事実を指摘する報告書をまとめた。複数の米当局者は「援助資金が独裁政権維持のために不正流用されたのではないかとの深刻な懸念が裏付けられた」としている。
 同報告書の指摘に対し、UNDPは同日、コメントを出し、「多額の資金が北朝鮮当局や核・ミサイル開発に流用されたと示す証拠は何もなかった」と主張している。
 議会調査小委がまとめた報告書によると、北朝鮮は、ブッシュ大統領が一般教書演説で北朝鮮などを「悪の枢軸」と名指しした後の2002年4月から9月の間に、総額約270万ドルを同国銀行の国連関連口座からマカオの金融機関バンコ・デルタ・アジア(BDA)の口座に9回にわたって送金した。BDAの口座は中国企業が管理されており、ここからニューヨークの北朝鮮国連代表部や欧州の北朝鮮外交施設に送金されたという。

 北朝鮮当局者は、米国による海外資産凍結などの制裁を恐れて国連関連口座を使用したことは認めているものの、資金はUNDPでなく、北朝鮮外務省のものと主張。
 これに対し、米政府関係者は鉱山開発などUNDPの開発援助資金が不正流用されたとの疑いを強めている。
 また、UNDPが開発事業の契約企業で、後に北朝鮮の兵器販売組織とのつながりがあることが判明した中国企業に5万ドルを支払っていた。UNDPは当時、中国企業と北朝鮮のつながりについて全く知らなかったと主張している。
 このほか報告書は、UNDPが内規に反し、北朝鮮政府があっせんした現地スタッフを雇ったこと、現地通貨で支払うはずの賃金や、物品調達費を米ドルやユーロなどの外貨で北朝鮮側に支払っていたことも指摘。UNDPの管理・運営上の欠陥が一連の問題を招いたと批判した。
 UNDPは昨年3月からすべての対北支援事業の執行を停止・凍結している。


---「北朝鮮のテロ支援国家指定を維持」と米大統領報道官---
2008.01.24 Web posted at: 12:31 JST Updated - AP CNN
http://www.cnn.co.jp/usa/CNN200801240001.html

ワシントン(AP) ブッシュ米政権は23日、北朝鮮が要求しているテロ支援国家指定の解除に応じるのは時期尚早だとの見方を示した。
米国務省のテロ対策主任であるデル・デーリー調整官は22日、記者団に対して、北朝鮮が指定解除に必要な条件を満たしているようだと発言。
しかしペリーノ米大統領報道官は23日、この件に関する質問を受けて、指定解除を明確に否定。「われわれは現在、北朝鮮が完全かつ正確に核計画を申告するのを待っている」と回答した。
米国は指定解除問題を、北朝鮮による6者協議の合意事項の履行状況を考慮したうえで検討する姿勢を維持している。


---U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs---
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
http://hsgac.senate.gov/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Hearings.Detail&HearingID=520

Title: United Nations Development Program: A Case Study Of North Korea
Date: 1/24/08
Time (EST): 10:00 AM
Place: Dirksen Senate Office Building, Rm. 342
The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations has scheduled a hearing, "United Nations Development Program: A Case Study Of North Korea," for Thursday, January 24, 2008, at 10 a.m., in Room 342 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building. (This hearing was previously scheduled for December 13, 2007.) In early 2007, reports surfaced of significant management failures in the operations of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in North Korea. Several months later, the UNDP took the unprecedented step of suspending its North Korean operations. The Subcommittee’s January 24th hearing will examine UNDP operations in North Korea, reviewing such issues as inappropriate staffing, inadequate administrative and fiscal controls, inaccessible audits and insufficient whistleblower safeguards. Witnesses for the upcoming hearing will include representatives of the Department of State and the Government Accountability Office. The Subcommittee will also receive a public briefing from representatives of the United Nations. A final witness list will be available Tuesday, January 22, 2008.


---REPORT: UNDP: A Case Study of North Korea (1/24/08)---
http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/012408Report.pdf

B. REPORT FINDINGS
Based upon its investigation into the United Nations Development Program operations in North Korea, the Subcommittee staff makes the following findings.

1. UNDP operated in North Korea with inappropriate staffing, questionable use of foreign currency instead of local currency, and insufficient administrative and fiscal controls.

Evidence obtained by the Subcommittee, including UNDP audits, witness interviews, and other relevant records, establishes management and operational deficiencies in the UNDP program in North Korea, including practices inconsistent with UN and UNDP standard operating procedures and best practices. Specifically, the Subcommittee found that: (1) UNDP’s DPRK office was staffed in large part with North Korean nationals who were selected by the DPRK,contrary to UNDP policy; (2) UNDP paid the salaries of local staff directly to the North Korean government without any way of verifying that the salaries were properly disbursed and despite UNDP’s suspicion that the DPRK was, in the words of one UNDP official, “skimming” money from the payments; (3) UNDP paid salaries and other expenses in convertible currencies, such as US Dollars or Euros, rather than in the local currency, contrary to UN best practices; (4) UNDP was required to conduct its financial transactions using a DPRK state bank that accepted paperwork only from DPRK personnel, sometimes routed UNDP funds through an unrelated bank account, and, until recently, refused to provide UNDP with copies of cancelled checks; and (5) UNDP was allowed to conduct on-site project visits only with prior notice and in the company of North Korean officials, contrary to UNDP best practices. The Subcommittee also learned that the UNDP office in Pyongyang operated without secure communications, and the regime routinely monitored UN activity, going so far as to enter and search private residences of UN personnel. In addition, a Subcommittee review of a UNDP internal audit revealed that nearly half of UNDP projects in the DPRK were conducted under a National Execution Strategy that ostensibly required direct payments to the host government for the implementation of UNDP projects. The Subcommittee learned, however, that by agreement with North Korea, UNDP maintained control of most of the projects’ financing and management. UNDP officials explained to the Subcommittee that, by directly controlling funds that were ostensibly slated to be managed nationally, UNDP accomplished two objectives: it respected sensitivities about national sovereignty and formal control over projects within a country’s borders, and it executed the projects using UNDP management and controls. In the case of the UNDP program in North Korea, however, this strategy also led to confusion over the amount of direct payments actually made to North Korea. In sum, UNDP operations in North Korea were carried out under significant constraints that undermined its standard administrative, fiscal, and program controls.

2. By preventing access to its audits and not submitting to the jurisdiction of the UN Ethics Office, UNDP impeded reasonable oversight and undermined its whistleblower protections.

UNDP commissioned four audits of its North Korean operations, in 1999, 2001, 2004,and 2007. Problems were identified in all four. The first three audits were nonpublic and, in accordance with UNDP policy, unavailable for review even by nations serving on the UNDP Executive Board. After repeated requests, UNDP made an exception to this policy and, in 2007,showed the audit reports to the US Mission to the United Nations, whose personnel were allowed to read but not copy them. The Subcommittee obtained copies from other sources and found the audits to be of great assistance in examining UNDP operations in North Korea. UN member states that are denied access to UN audits are denied relevant and timely information about program operations and have few alternative means of ensuring that UN contributions are being spent properly. Had UNDP audits of its North Korean operations been contemporaneously available for review by members of the UNDP Executive Board, the Board members could have evaluated the practices and determined what actions to take, if any, to address concerns.
UNDP’s Administrator has recently submitted a proposal to the Executive Board to give Board members routine access to future UNDP audits by allowing the audit reports to be reviewed but not copied.
Beginning in 2005, Artjon Shkurtaj, then Operations Manager of the UNDP office in Pyongyang, raised concerns about management and operational deficiencies in UNDP operations. After raising these concerns, Mr. Shkurtaj’s UNDP employment contract was not renewed. He then filed a complaint with the UN Ethics Office claiming that UNDP had retaliated against him. The UN Ethics Office, which was created by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in January 2006, was intended to apply UN-wide ethics rules. In August 2007, however,
the Ethics Office determined that, although Mr. Shkurtaj had established “a prima facie case of retaliation,” it lacked jurisdiction to decide his claim and could protect only whistleblowers within the UN Secretariat. UNDP declined a request by the Ethics Office that it voluntarily submit the Shkurtaj matter for an Ethics Office review, later forming an ad hoc review team and referring the matter to that team. UNDP actions and the Ethics Office decision have undermined confidence among UN employees that UN whistleblowers who speak out about UN mismanagement will be protected from retribution. In November 2007, the UN Secretary4 General issued a bulletin requiring each UN agency to establish its own ethics office or submit to the jurisdiction of the Ethics Office within the Secretariat.

3. In 2002, the DPRK government used its relationship with the United Nations to execute deceptive financial transactions by moving $2.72million of its own funds from Pyongyang to DPRK diplomatic missions abroad through a bank account intended to be used solely for UNDP activities and by referencing UNDP in the wire transfer documents.

The Subcommittee gathered evidence that, over a six-month period in 2002, the North Korean government used the cover of the UNDP’s presence in the DPRK to move $2.72 million of its own funds out of North Korea. The evidence, which includes wire transfer and other documentation from US and foreign financial institutions, indicates that the North Korean government transferred the money from Pyongyang to its diplomatic missions abroad via a circuitous route involving a bank account reserved for UNDP funds at the DPRK state-owned Foreign Trade Bank (“FTB”) and a Chinese company known as the International Finance and Trade Joint Company (“IFTJ”), which acted as a conduit for the North Korean funds. Each transaction moved funds from the FTB bank account to an IFTJ account at a bank in the Chinese administered territory of Macau, and from there to DPRK diplomatic missions in the United States and Europe. Each of the wire transfers referenced UNDP. UNDP has stated that these transactions were wholly unrelated to its development projects, and North Korean officials have confirmed that the funds originated with the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and were not
related to the UNDP.
By routing its funds through a bank account reserved for UNDP development funds, the North Korean government made a concerted effort to conceal the movement of its funds out of North Korea and into western financial institutions. North Korean officials explained to the Subcommittee that these transfers occurred soon after US President George Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address in which he described North Korea as part of an “axis of evil.” North Korean officials told the Subcommittee that they expected sanctions against their country would be tightened and were concerned that their wire transfers would be barred or frozen. They told the Subcommittee that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs identified the UNDP-related account as a more secure channel to fund their embassies abroad.

4. UNDP transferred UN funds to a company that, according to a letter from the US State Department to UNDP, has ties to an entity involved in DPRK weapons activity.

UNDP regularly made payments to contractors on behalf of other UN agencies operating in North Korea. During the course of its investigation, the Subcommittee learned that payments on behalf of other UN agencies – totaling approximately $50,000 – were made to an entity named Zang Lok Trading Co. in Macau. According to a letter dated June 7, 2007, to UNDP from the US Permanent Mission to the United Nations, Zang Lok “has ties to a North Korean entity that has been designated [by the US government] as the main North Korean financial agent for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons.” UNDP maintains that it does not know, and has no way of knowing, whether Zang Lok is connected to North Korean weapons sales.

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