2008年5月25日日曜日

米議会調査局 核武装なら常任理事国入りは無理

米議会調査局(CRS)は日本が核武装なら常任理事国入りは無理と言う。
マケインが日本を核武装させると言ったら、CRS Reportはだめと言う。
オバマは、ブッシュに「話合いでは殺戮は無くならない」と批判されたためか
「北朝鮮のテロ支援国家指定解除に賛成することはない」と表明した。
慰安婦問題で中立的立場で報告書を提出したCRSの評価を核武装論を展開する
人たちはどう見るのだろうか。

米国からすれば核の傘による優位性を理由に植民地支配を行っていたが、
その傘から外れれば、安保の形が変わることになる。
また、技術的開発が進み、アタッシュケース型核爆弾が弾丸型核爆弾となる
可能性もある。次期戦闘機開発においても横槍を入れてくる米政府が核武装を
容認することはないと思う。
マケインによる日本の核武装は、日本政府所有による核武装ではなく、
在日米軍による核武装が現実的だと思う。横須賀に原子力空母が寄航できた
こと、ブラックストーンCEOによる長崎原爆の例えに無反応なことで、
日本の核アレルギーは峠を越えたと見ていることだろう。


---米国:「核武装なら常任理事国入りダメ」日本をけん制---
毎日新聞 2008年5月24日 12時55分
http://mainichi.jp/select/world/america/news/20080524k0000e030055000c.html

 【ワシントン及川正也】日本が核武装すればアジアの軍拡競争を招き、米国の核不拡散政策に打撃を与える--。米議会調査局はこのほど日本が核兵器開発を決めた場合の影響を分析した報告書をまとめ、議会に提出した。日本の核武装が「アジア軍拡」を触発するとの見方は従前からあるが、対中脅威論の高まりを受け、米国内でも「日本の核武装容認論」が浮上している現状を踏まえ、改めて検討が加えられた。
 報告書は9日付。「短中期的には日本が核オプションを追求することはない」とする一方、日本が核武装する場合の背景として▽米中が冷戦時の米ソのように冷却化するか、急接近して戦略的関係や核管理で合意する▽北朝鮮が核保有したまま南北朝鮮が統一し日本を敵視する、などの安全保障環境の変化を例示した。
 日本が核兵器開発を決断すれば、連鎖的に「韓国や台湾などが核開発計画に着手し、多くの核保有国が生まれる」と指摘。その結果、核拡散防止条約(NPT)など不拡散体制は「修復不可能な打撃」を受け、日本は「核不拡散の先駆者として国際的名声」を失い、「国連安保理常任理事国入りの可能性はなくなる」と警告した。
 一方、日本の核武装は「米国の不拡散政策にも打撃を与える」と強調。米国が主導して北朝鮮を核放棄に追い込むという作業も「困難をきたす」と分析した。日本の核武装を避けるためには「米国は日本の防衛を再確認するだけでなく、同盟維持のため日本の指導者たちと常に協議する必要がある」と提唱している。


------日本が核武装なら軍拡競争に=米議会報告書が警告---
2008/05/23-08:34
http://www.jiji.com/jc/c?g=pol_30&k=2008052300124

 【ワシントン22日時事】米議会調査局(CRS)は22日までに、日本の核武装の可能性やその影響について分析した報告書を作成、日本が万一、核兵器の開発を決めた場合、アジアでの核軍拡競争を招く恐れがあると警告した。
 また、世界的な核不拡散体制に打撃を与えることになり、日本に対する国際的評価は損なわれ、国連安保理常任理事国入りの可能性はなくなるとの見方が多いと指摘した。


---オバマ氏、北のテロ支援国解除問題で方針転換---
2008/05/22 10:01:58
ワシントン=李河遠(イ・ハウォン)特派員
朝鮮日報/朝鮮日報JNS
http://www.chosunonline.com/article/20080522000031

 米国民主党の有力な大統領候補であるバラク・オバマ上院議員が、2000年に北朝鮮に拉致されて死亡したとされるキム・ドンシク牧師の問題について北朝鮮政府が説明を行うまでは、北朝鮮のテロ支援国家指定解除に賛成することはないとの立場を表明していたことが、21日までに確認された。
 オバマ上院議員は05年1月28日、当時のデニス・ハスタート下院議長、ヘンリー・ハイド下院国際関係委員長らと共に、イリノイ州の連邦上下院議員ら20人が、北朝鮮の朴吉淵(パク・キルヨン)国連大使に発送したキム牧師問題について問いただす書簡に署名していた。
 上下院議員らはこの書簡で、キム牧師の夫人が住むイリノイ州シカゴの韓国人教会を中心に、キム牧師拉致の事実が問題になっているとして、「根本的な人権問題であるだけでなく、選挙区民の重要な関心事項でもあるという点で重要だ」と訴えていた。
 しかしオバマ議員は現時点では、ブッシュ政権が近く議会に伝えることになっている、北朝鮮に対するテロ支援国家解除問題について反対の立場をとっていない。オバマ議員はむしろ自らが政権をとれば、金正日(キム・ジョンイル)総書記ら敵対国の指導者たちとも会い、対話を行いたいとの考えを何度も表明している。


---Japan’s Nuclear Future:Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests---
Order Code RL34487
May 9, 2008
Emma Chanlett-Avery
Analyst in Asian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Mary Beth Nikitin
Analyst in Nonproliferation
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34487_20080509.pdf

Japan’s Nuclear Future:
Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests

Summary
Japan, traditionally one of the most prominent advocates of the international non-proliferation regime, has consistently pledged to forswear nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, evolving circumstances in Northeast Asia, particularly North Korea’s nuclear test in October 2006 and China’s ongoing military modernization drive, have raised new questions about Japan’s vulnerability to potential adversaries and, therefore, the appeal of developing an independent nuclear deterrent. The previous taboo within the Japanese political community of discussing a nuclear weapons capability appears to have been broken, as several officials and opinion leaders have urged an open debate on the topic. Despite these factors, a strong consensus — both in Japan and among Japan watchers — remains that Japan will not pursue the nuclear option in the short-to-medium term.

This paper examines the prospects for Japan pursuing a nuclear weapons capability by assessing the existing technical infrastructure of its extensive civilian nuclear energy program. It explores the range of challenges that Japan would have to overcome to transform its current program into a military program. Presently, Japan appears to lack several of the prerequisites for a full-scale nuclear weapons deterrent: expertise on bomb design, reliable delivery vehicles, an intelligence program to protect and conceal assets, and sites for nuclear testing. In addition, a range of legal and political restraints on Japan’s development of nuclear weapons, including averse public and elite opinion, restrictive domestic laws and practices, and the negative diplomatic consequences of abandoning its traditional approach is analyzed.

Any reconsideration and/or shift of Japan’s policy of nuclear abstention would have significant implications for U.S. policy in East Asia. In this report, an examination of the factors driving Japan’s decision-making — most prominently, the strength of the U.S. security guarantee — analyzes how the nuclear debate in Japan affects U.S. security interests in the region. Globally, Japan’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) would damage the world’s most durable international non-proliferation regime. Regionally, Japan “going nuclear” could set off an arms race with China, South Korea, and Taiwan. India and/or Pakistan may then feel compelled to further expand or modernize their own nuclear weapons capabilities. Bilaterally, assuming that Japan made the decision without U.S. support, the move could indicate a lack of trust in the U.S. commitment to defend Japan. An erosion in the U.S.-Japan alliance could upset the geopolitical balance in East Asia, a shift that could strengthen China’s position as an emerging hegemonic power. All of these ramifications would likely be deeply destabilizing for the security of the Asia Pacific region and beyond.

This report will be updated as circumstances warrant.

Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate,
Prospects, and U.S. Interests

Introduction

The notion of Japan developing nuclear weapons has long been considered farfetched and even taboo, particularly within Japan. Hailed as an example of the success of the international non-proliferation regime, Japan has consistently taken principled stands on non-proliferation and disarmament issues. Domestically, the largely pacifist Japanese public, with lingering memories of the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by atomic bombs in the closing days of World War II, has widely rejected any nuclear capacity as morally unacceptable. The inclusion of Japan under the U.S. nuclear “umbrella,” with regular reiterations from U.S. officials, provides a guarantor to Japanese security. Successive Japanese administrations and commissions have concluded that Japan has little to gain and much to lose in terms of its own security if it pursues a nuclear weapons capability.

Today, Japanese officials and experts remain remarkably uniform in their consensus that Japan is unlikely to move toward nuclear status in the short-tomedium term. However, as the security environment has shifted significantly, the topic is no longer toxic and has been broached by several leading politicians. North Korea’s test of a nuclear device in 2006 and China’s military modernization have altered the strategic dynamics in the region, and any signs of stress in the U.S.-Japan alliance raises questions among some about the robustness of the U.S. security guarantee. An ascendant hawkish, conservative movement — some of whom openly advocate for Japan to develop an independent nuclear arsenal — has gained more traction in Japanese politics, moving from the margins to a more influential position. In addition, previous security-related taboos have been overcome in the past few years: the dispatch of Japanese military equipment and personnel to Iraq and Afghanistan, the elevation of the Japanese Defense Agency to a full-scale ministry, and Japanese co-development of a missile defense system with the United States. All of these factors together increase the still unlikely possibility that Japan will reconsider its position on nuclear weapons.

Any reconsideration of Japan’s policy of nuclear weapons abstention would have significant implications for U.S. policy in East Asia. Globally, Japan’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) could damage the most durable international non-proliferation regime. Regionally, Japan “going nuclear” could set off a nuclear arms race with China, South Korea, and Taiwan and, in turn, India, and Pakistan may feel compelled to further strengthen their own nuclear weapons capability. Bilaterally, assuming that Japan made the decision without U.S. support, the move could indicate Tokyo’s lack of trust in the American commitment to defend Japan. An erosion in the U.S.-Japan alliance could upset the geopolitical balance in East Asia, a shift that could indicate a further strengthening of China’s position as an emerging hegemonic power. These ramifications would likely be deeply destabilizing for the security of the Asia Pacific region and beyond.

Background
Japan’s post-war policy on nuclear weapons and non-proliferation has been to reject officially a military nuclear program. The Japanese Army and Navy each onducted nuclear weapons research during World War II, but neither was successful in gaining enough resources for the endeavor.1 Despite the fact that by the early 1970s Japan had already acquired the technical, industrial and scientific resources needed to develop its own nuclear weapons, Japanese policy has repeatedly stated its opposition to the development of nuclear weapons.

Complicating Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons policy has been a post-World War II dependence on the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” and security guarantee. Under the terms of the Mutual Security Assistance Pact signed in 1952 and the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, Japan grants the U.S. military basing rights on its territory in return for a U.S. pledge to protect Japan’s security. The rejection of nuclear weapons by the Japanese public appears to be overwhelmingly driven by moral, rather than pragmatic, considerations, but Japan’s leaders have based their policy of forswearing nuclear weapons on protection by the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

The bedrock of domestic law on the subject, the “Atomic Energy Basic Law” of 1955, requires Japan’s nuclear activities to be conducted only for peaceful purposes. In 1967, the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” (hikaku sangensoku) were announced by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, enshrining the policy of not possessing, not producing, and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. When Japan ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1976, it reiterated its three non-nuclear principles, placed itself under the treaty obligation as a non-nuclear weapons state, and pledged not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons. Japan has been a staunch NPT supporter in good standing ever since.

Despite multiple reiterations of Japan’s non-nuclear status, this orthodoxy has been challenged on several occasions, usually when Japan has felt strategic vulnerability. Probably the most prominent episode occurred in the mid-1960s:China tested a nuclear device for the first time in 1964, and the United States was engaged in the Vietnam War. Prime Minister Eisaku Sato secretly commissioned several academics to produce a study exploring the costs and benefits of Japan’s possible nuclearization, the so-called “1968/70 Internal Report.”2 Another secret investigation into Japan’s nuclear option was done by the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) in 1995 as Japan assessed its standing in the new post-Cold War environment after the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis in 1994 and as the international community was considering the indefinite extension of the NPT.3 Both reports concluded that Japan should continue to rely on the U.S. security guarantee and that development of nuclear weapons would threaten that relationship.

1 Priority was placed on biological and chemical weapons programs. Kurt M. Campbell and Tsuyoshi Sunohara, “Japan,” in Campbell, Einhorn, Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point,Brookings Institution Press, 2004; and Federation of American Scientists website.[http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/japan/nuke/]
2 Yuri Kase, “The Costs and Benefits of Japan’s Nuclearization: An Insight into the 1968/70 Internal Report,” The Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2001.


An Evolving Security Environment in Asia
Since the end of the Cold War, and particularly in the past decade, developments in the region have increased Japan’s sense of vulnerability and caused some in the policy community to rethink Japan’s policy of forswearing nuclear weapons development. During the Cold War, the U.S. military presence in Japan represented the Pacific front of containing the Soviets, a reassuring statement of commitment to Japan’s security to many Japanese. North Korea’s test of a ballistic missile over Japan in August 1998 dispelled the sense of a more secure post-Cold War environment for the archipelago. Moreover, India and Pakistan both conducted underground nuclear weapons tests earlier that year, which to many undermined the success of the international non-proliferation regime and set off fears of a new nuclear arms race. Japan was particularly alarmed at the tests, and instituted a freeze on new loans and grants to the two states.

Since then, more provocative behavior from Pyongyang, particularly its 2006 tests of medium-range missiles and a nuclear device, have heightened Japan’s fear of potential attacks. The nuclear test prompted prominent officials in the ruling party to call for an open debate on whether to pursue nuclear arms: both Foreign Minister Taro Aso and chairman of the party’s policy council called for such a debate before later backing off their comments. In addition to North Korea’s activities, a proposed U.S.-India civilian nuclear deal has led to concern among some Japanese nonproliferation experts that the NPT has weakened further. To these experts, the legitimacy and deterrent effect of the global non-proliferation regime underpins Japan’s commitment to its own non-nuclear status.

While North Korea represents a more immediate danger, many defense experts see China as the more serious and long-term threat to Japan’s security.4 China’s rapid military modernization and advancements in weapons systems have compounded Tokyo’s concern. Japanese defense papers have pointed to Beijing’s apparent progress in short and medium range missiles, its submarine force (some of which have on occasion intruded into Japan’s territorial waters), and nuclear force modernization as specific areas of concern. As Chinese military spending continues to accelerate, Japanese defense budgets have stagnated. Although Sino-Japanese relations appear to have stabilized since a period of tension under former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s administration, fundamental distrust and the potential for conflict remains between the Pacific powers.

3 “‘95 Study: Japan and Nukes Don’t Mix,” The Asahi Shimbun, February 20, 2003.
4 Hajime Izumi and Katsuhisa Furukawa. “Not Going Nuclear: Japan’s Response to North Korea’s Nuclear Test,” Nautilus Institute Policy Forum Online. July 19, 2007.

Japan’s Nuclear Capacity
Japan’s Nuclear Energy Program
Japan is a country poor in natural resources but with a high level of energy consumption. Since the 1960s, Japan has relied on nuclear power for a significant portion of its energy; nuclear energy currently provides 35% of its electricity. The Japan Atomic Energy Commission’s 2005 Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy emphasizes the importance of nuclear power for energy independence and carbon emission reduction. Japan is currently the third-largest user of nuclear energy in the world, with 55 light-water nuclear power reactors (49.58 million kW) operated by 10 electric power companies. The first commercial power reactor began operation in 1966. Two nuclear power plants are under construction, four are in the final stages of regulatory review, and an additional seven may be built over the next decade.

Japan’s policy is to achieve a fully independent, or “closed,” fuel cycle.5 The closed fuel cycle promotes the use of mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel in light-water reactors. The set goal is to have 16-18 such reactors by fiscal year 2010, and utilities in Japan are now in the process of being licensed for MOX loading and obtaining consent from the local governments. The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) was established on October 1, 2005, to integrate Japan’s R&D institutes, the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute and the Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute. JAEA carries out R&D work on the full range of fuel cycle activities.

Two of the more controversial aspects of Japan’s civilian power program are its large stocks of separated plutonium and advanced fuel cycle facilities. Plutonium is a by-product of the uranium fuel used in all nuclear reactors. Plutonium in spent fuel is not weapons-usable. Once the plutonium is separated out of spent fuel through reprocessing, it is directly usable in nuclear weapons. This separated plutonium can also be “recycled” into MOX fuel for light-water power reactors. France, India, Japan, Russia and the U.K. currently all produce reactor fuel through reprocessing.

The global stockpile of separated plutonium is estimated to be about 500 tons, including military and civilian stocks.6 Stocks of civilian separated plutonium are growing around the world. According to the 2005 declared annual inventory under IAEA INFCIRC/549, Japan possesses 5.9 MT of civilian stocks of separated plutonium stored in Japan, and 37.9 MT of separated plutonium stored outside the country.7 This material has the potential to make over 1,000 nuclear weapons.Japan’s civilian separated plutonium stockpile is expected to grow to 70 tons by2020.8

To date, Japan has sent its spent fuel to the United Kingdom (Sellafield) and France (La Hague) for reprocessing and MOX fuel fabrication. But Japan is completing facilities which will eliminate the need for such outsourcing. The private company Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited (JNFL) has built and is currently running active testing on a large-scale commercial reprocessing plant at Rokkasho-mura, which is expected to begin operating sometime in 2008. Its expected capacity is 800tons/year.9 A MOX fuel fabrication plant currently being built by JNFL at Rokkasho-mura is expected to be completed in October 2012.

Around 2050, Japan plans to shift from MOX fuel in light water reactors to using MOX fuel in fast breeder reactors.10 R&D work continues using the prototype MONJU and JOYO fast breeder reactors, despite earlier criticality accidents. A final disposal site for high level radioactive waste has not yet been selected. Japan plans to store and dispose of its nuclear waste domestically.11 Japan also has a uranium enrichment R&D facility at Tokai-mura and is developing an advanced centrifuge uranium enrichment plant at Rokkasho-mura.

The Rokkasho-mura reprocessing facility, the first in a non-nuclear weapon state, has raised some proliferation concerns.12 Concerns have been raised in particular over the construction of an industrial-scale reprocessing facility in Japan,.Additionally, fast breeder reactors also produce more plutonium than they consume, potentially posing a proliferation risk. Some cautionary voices point out that advanced countries have been shifting away from the pursuit of reprocessing technologies as the international community strives to find appropriate multilateral approaches to containing the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to new countries.13

To counteract public concern, Japan emphasizes transparency in all aspects of its nuclear activities to assure the public and international community that atomic energy is used solely for peaceful purposes. The JAEA is required by Japanese law to make public the quantity of plutonium in possession and a plutonium use plan each fiscal year. All of Japan’s nuclear facilities are subject to IAEA full-scope safeguards, and an Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement came into force in December 1999. The protocol augments the agency’s authority to verify that nuclear activities are not diverted to military purposes. Japan has also been a leader in developing advanced safeguards technologies with the IAEA, and participates in multilateral advanced research efforts for future fuel cycle technologies, such as Generation IV International Forum (Gen-IV), International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) and the U.S.-led Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP).14

5 Natural uranium ore first passes through the refining, conversion, enrichment, reconversion and fabrication processes before it is fed into the nuclear reactor as a metal-sheathed fuel. Following irradiation, the spent fuel from the reactor is sent to a reprocessing plant where the residual uranium and newly produced plutonium are recovered for re-use as fuel. Then, the plutonium oxide is mixed with uranium oxide at a MOX fuel conversion plant to produce a mixed oxide nuclear fuel. MOX fuel can then be irradiated just like fresh fuel in a nuclear power plant. This entire process is called the “closed” nuclear fuel cycle. See http://www.japannuclear.com/nuclearpower/fuelcycle/what.html.
6 Global Fissile Material Report 2007, IPFM. [http://www.fissilematerials.org]
7 One metric ton is approximately 1.1 US tons.
8 Global Fissile Material Report 2007, IPFM. [http://www.fissilematerials.org]
9 A pilot reprocessing plant began full-scale operation in 1981 at the Tokai Nuclear Fuel
Cycle Engineering Laboratories.
10 A fast breeder reactor is a fast neutron reactor that produces more plutonium than it
consumes, which can then be reused as fuel in the reactor, thereby creating a closed fuel
cycle.
11 For more on waste storage in Japan, see http://www.japannuclear.com/nuclearpower/
program/waste.html.
12 A nuclear weapon state as defined by the NPT is limited to states that have detonated a
nuclear weapon or nuclear explosive device before January 1, 1967. The United States,
United Kingdom, Russia, France and China are the five nuclear-weapon states under the
NPT. All other NPT parties are non-nuclear weapon states.
13 Since Japan has been in possession of this technology for decades, it does not fall into the
category of countries whose access to the technology might be limited in the future. See
CRS Report RL34234, Mary Beth Nikitin, Jill Marie Padillo, Sharon Squassoni, Anthony Andrews and Mark Holt, “Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Policy Implications of Expanding Global Access to Nuclear Power.”
14 [http://www.gen-4.org/index.html], [http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/ST/NE/NENP/ NPTDS/Projects/INPRO/index.html], [http://www.gnep.energy.gov/]
15 Tetsuya Endo, “How Realistic Is a Nuclear-Armed Japan?” AJISS-Commentary No. 8, July 20, 2007.

Technological Potential
Japan’s technological advancement in the nuclear field, combined with its stocks of separated plutonium, have contributed to the conventional wisdom that Japan could produce nuclear weapons in a short period of time. In 1974, Prime Minister Tsutomu Hata famously told reporters that “it’s certainly the case that Japan has the capability to possess nuclear weapons but has not made them.” Indeed, few dispute that Japan could make nuclear weapons if Tokyo were to invest the necessary financial and other resources.

However, the ability to develop a few nuclear weapons versus the technological, financial and manpower requirements of a full nuclear deterrent should be considered. Producing nuclear weapons would require expertise on bomb design including metallurgists and chemists; while a reliable deterrent capability may also require reliable delivery vehicles, an intelligence program to protect and conceal assets from a first-strike, and a system for the protection of classified information. The 1995 JDA report stated that Japan’s geography and concentrated populations made the political and economic costs of building the infrastructure for a nuclear weapons program “exorbitant.” If one assumes that Japan would want weapons with high reliability and accuracy, then more time would need to be devoted to their development unless a weapon or information was supplied by an outside source.

As some analysts have pointed out, if Japan manufactured nuclear warheads, then it would need to at the minimum perform one nuclear test — but where this could be carried out on the island nation is far from clear.15 Furthermore, Japan’s nuclear materials and facilities are under IAEA safeguards, making a clandestine nuclear weapons program difficult to conceal. The Rokkasho-mura reprocessing plant was built in close consultation with the IAEA, with safeguards systems installed in process lines during construction. Japan seems to have intentionally built its nuclear program so it would not be ideal for military use, in compliance with Japanese law.

Japanese Legal and Political Restraints
Domestic Factors
Public Opinion. In general, public opinion on defense issues in Japan appears to be shifting somewhat, but pacifist sentiment remains significant. In the past, Japanese public opinion strongly supported the limitations placed on the Japanese ilitary, but this opposition has softened considerably since the late 1990s. Despite this overall shifting tide, the “nuclear allergy” among the general public remains strong. The devastation of the atomic bombings led Japanese society to recoil from any military use of nuclear energy. Observers say that the Japanese public remains overwhelmingly opposed to nuclearization, pointing to factors like an educational system that promotes pacifism and the few surviving victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki who serve as powerful reminders of the bombs’ effects.

While Japanese public opinion remains, by most accounts, firmly anti-nuclear, some social currents could eventually change the conception of nuclear development. Many observers have recognized a trend of growing nationalism in Japan, particularly among the younger generation. Some Japanese commentators have suggested that this increasing patriotism could jeopardize closer cooperation with the United States: if Japan feels too reliant on U.S. forces and driven by U.S. priorities, some may assert the need for Japan to develop its own independent capability. Another wild card is the likelihood that Japan will face a major demographic challenge because of its rapidly ageing population: such a shock could either drive Japan closer to the United States because of heightened insecurity, or could spur nationalism that may lean toward developing more autonomy.
Elite Opinions. A review of recent articles and interviews with prominent Japanese opinion-makers and experts revealed a near-consensus of opposition to the development of nuclear weapons.16 Realist-minded security observers cite the danger of threatening China and causing unnecessary instability in the region, while foreign policy managers point to the risk of weakening the U.S. alliance. Some observers claim, however, that a younger generation of upcoming elites may be more nationalistic and therefore potentially more supportive of the option in the future.

There is some degree of disagreement in Japan on if a debate itself about whether Japan should consider the nuclear option would be a valuable exercise.
Some nuclear critics argue that such a debate would solidify Japan’s non-nuclear stance by articulating for the public why not possessing nuclear weapons serves the national interest. The debate could also reassure those who oppose Japan’s nuclear development. Others, however, argue that simply raising the issue would alarm Japan’s neighbors, arouse distrust, and negatively affect regional security. Domestically, some analysts think that a public debate on nuclear weapons would outrage the Japanese public, making most politicians averse to the proposal.

Constitutional Restraints. There are several legal factors that could restrict Japan’s ability to develop nuclear weapons. The most prominent is Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, drafted by American officials during the post-war occupation, that outlaws war as a “sovereign right” of Japan and prohibits “the right of belligerency.” However, Japan maintains a well-funded and well-equipped military for self-defense purposes, and the current interpretation of the constitution would allow, in theory, the development of nuclear weapons for defensive purposes. Beginning with Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi in 1957, and continuing through Shinzo Abe in 2006, Japanese administrations have repeatedly asserted that Article 9 is not the limiting factor to developing nuclear weapons.17 As Chief Cabinet Secretary in 2002, current Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda said that the constitution did not prohibit nuclear weapons, adding that “depending upon the world situation, circumstances and public opinion could require Japan to possess nuclear weapons.”18

1955 Atomic Energy Basic Law. Although the Constitution may be interpreted to allow for possession of nuclear weapons, since 1955 Japanese domestic law prohibited any military purpose for nuclear activities.19 Its basic policy statement (Article 2) says: “the research, development, and utilization of atomic energy shall
be limited to peaceful purposes, aimed at ensuring safety and performed independently under democratic management, the results therefrom shall be made public to contribute to international cooperation.” This law, which also established regulatory bodies for safety and control issues, is at the core of Japanese policy in
maintaining a peaceful, transparent nuclear program.

Three Non-Nuclear Principles. Japanese leaders have often cited the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” as another obstacle to Japanese development of nuclear weapons. The trio consists of Japanese pledges not to allow the manufacture, possession, or importation of nuclear weapons. Many security experts, however, point out that the principles, passed as a Diet resolution in 1971 as part of domestic negotiations over the return of Okinawa from U.S. control, were never formally adopted into law, and therefore are not legally binding.20 Although not technically a legal constraint, Japanese leaders have consistently stated their commitment to the principles, including a reiteration by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in the aftermath of North Korea’s nuclear test in 2006.

16 According to a series of interviews carried out in Tokyo in February 2007 as well as articles such as Hajime Izumi and Katsuhisa Furukawa. “Not Going Nuclear: Japan’s Response to North Korea’s Nuclear Test,” Arms Control Today, Volume 37; Issue 6. July 1, 2007.
17 Llewelyn Hughes, “Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet),” International Security, Vol. 31, No. 4. Spring 2007.
18 “So Much for Japan’s Nuclear Taboo,” International Herald Tribune. June 13, 2002.
19 [http://www.jaea.go.jp/jnc/kaihatu/hukaku/english/atomiclaw.htm]
20 Llewelyn Hughes, “Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet),” International Security, Vol.31, No. 4. Spring 2007.

External Factors
International Law. Japan is obligated under Article 2 of the NPT not to “receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” Under Article 3 of the NPT, Japan is required to accept IAEA full-scope safeguards on its civilian nuclear program. Japan signed an Additional Protocol in 1998 under which the IAEA can use an expanded range of measures to verify that civilian facilities and materials have not been diverted to a military program.

Consequences for Civilian Nuclear Program. Lacking adequate indigenous uranium supplies, Japan has bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation agreements with the United States, France, United Kingdom, China, Canada, and Australia. If a Japanese nuclear program for military purposes were declared or discovered, Japan would need to return the supplied material to its country of origin. Japan’s civilian nuclear energy program — which supplies over a third of Japan’s energy — would then be cut off from world supplies of natural uranium, enriched uranium and related equipment.

The United States most recent nuclear energy cooperation agreement with Japan took effect on July 17, 1988. Article 12 of this agreement states that, if either party does not comply with the agreement’s nonproliferation provisions or violates their IAEA safeguards agreement, the other party has the right to cease further cooperation, terminate the agreement, and require the return of any material, nuclear material, equipment or components transferred or “any special fissionable material produced through the use of such items.”

If Japan withdrew from the NPT, it would likely be subject to UN Security Council-imposed sanctions and economic and diplomatic isolation. Penalties under a U.N. Security Council resolution could include economic sanctions beyond the Nuclear Suppliers Group cut-off of nuclear-related supply.

International Diplomatic Consequences. Diplomatically, the policy turnabout would have profound implications. Japan has built a reputation as a leader in non-proliferation and as a promoter of nuclear disarmament. It has consistently called for a “safe world free of nuclear weapons on the earliest possible date.” Japan submits a resolution to the General Assembly’s First Committee each year on a nuclear-free world and submits working papers to the NPT review conferences and preparatory committees on disarmament. It has been a vocal advocate for IAEA verification and compliance and was the first to respond with sanctions to nuclear tests in South Asia and North Korea. It has been a constant voice in support of nuclear disarmament in international fora. An about-face on its non-nuclear weapon state status would dramatically change the global view of Japan, or might dramatically change the perception of nuclear weapons possession in the world. This move could have profound implications for nuclear proliferation elsewhere, perhaps leading to additional NPT withdrawals. Acquiring nuclear weapons could also hurt Japan’s long-term goal of permanent membership on the UN Security Council.

Issues for U.S. Policy
U.S. Security Commitment. Perhaps the single most important factor to date in dissuading Tokyo from developing a nuclear arsenal is the U.S. guarantee to rotect Japan’s security. Since the threat of nuclear attack developed during the Cold War, Japan has been included under the U.S. “nuclear umbrella,” although some ambiguity exists about whether the United States is committed to respond with nuclear weapons in the event of a nuclear attack on Japan.21 U.S. officials have hinted that it would: following North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, in Tokyo, said, “...the United States has the will and the capability to meet the full range, and I underscore full range, of its deterrent and security commitments to Japan.”22

During the Cold War, the threat of mutually assured destruction to the United States and the Soviet Union created a sort of perverse stability in international politics; Japan, as the major Pacific front of the U.S. containment strategy, felt confident in U.S. extended deterrence. Although the United States has reiterated its commitment to defend Japan, the strategic stakes have changed, leading some in Japan to question the American pledge. Some in Japan are nervous that if the United States develops a closer relationship with China, the gap between Tokyo’s and Washington’s security perspectives will grow and further weaken the U.S. commitment.23 These critics also point to what they perceive as the soft negotiating position on North Korea’s denuclearization in the Six-Party Talks as further evidence that the United States does not share Japan’s strategic perspective.24 A weakening of the bilateral alliance may strengthen the hand of those that want to explore the possibility of Japan developing its own deterrence.

Despite these concerns, many long-time observers assert that the alliance is fundamentally sound from years of cooperation and strong defense ties throughout even the rocky trade wars of the 1980s. Perhaps more importantly, China’s rising stature likely means that the United States will want to keep its military presence in the region in place, and Japan is the major readiness platform for the U.S. military in East Asia. If the United States continues to see the alliance with Japan as a fundamental component of its presence in the Pacific, U.S. leaders may need to continue to not only restate the U.S. commitment to defend Japan, but to engage in high-level consultation with Japanese leaders in order to allay concerns of alliance drift. Congressional leaders could face pressure to re-consider allowing the sale of the F-22 Raptor aircraft in order to bolster trust in the alliance.25

U.S. behavior plays an outsized role in determining Japan’s strategic calculations, particularly in any debate on developing nuclear weapons. Security experts concerned about Japan’s nuclear option have stressed that U.S. officials or influential commentators should not signal to the Japanese any tacit approval of nuclearization.26 Threatening other countries with the possibility of Japan going
nuclear, for example, could be construed as approval by some quarters in Tokyo.

U.S.-Japanese joint development of a theater missile defense system reinforces the U.S. security commitment to Japan, both psychologically and practically. The test-launch of several missiles by North Korea in July 2006 accelerated existing plans to jointly deploy Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) surface-to-air interceptors as well as a sea-based system on Aegis destroyers. If successfully operationalized, confidence in the ability to intercept incoming missiles may help assuage Japan’s fear of foreign attacks. This reassurance may discourage any potential consideration of developing a deterrent nuclear force. In addition, the joint effort would more closely intertwine U.S. and Japan security, although obstacles still remain for a seamless integration.27

Potential for Asian Arms Race. To many security experts, the most alarming possible consequence of a Japanese decision to develop nuclear weapons would be the development of a regional arms race.28 The fear is based on the belief that a nuclear-armed Japan could compel South Korea to develop its own program; encourage China to increase and/or improve its relatively small arsenal; and possibly inspire Taiwan to pursue nuclear weapons. This in turn might have spill-over effects on the already nuclear-armed India and Pakistan. The prospect — or even reality — of several nuclear states rising in a region that is already rife with historical grievances and contemporary tension could be deeply destabilizing. The counterargument, made by some security experts, is that nuclear deterrence was stabilizing during the Cold War, and a similar nuclear balance could be achieved in Asia. However, most observers maintain that the risks outweigh potential stabilizing factors.

U.S.-China Relations. The course of the relationship between Beijing and Washington over the next several years is likely to have a significant impact on the nuclearization debate in Japan. If the relationship chills substantially and a Cold War-type standoff develops, there may be calls from some in the United States to reinforce the U.S. deterrent forces. Some hawkish U.S. commentators have called for Japan to be “unleashed” in order to counter China’s strength.29 Depending on the severity of the perceived threat from China, Japanese and U.S. officials could reconsider their views on Japan’s non-nuclear status. Geopolitical calculations likely would have to shift considerably for this scenario to gain currency. On the other hand, if U.S.-Sino relations become much closer, Japan may feel that it needs to develop a more independent defense posture. This is particularly true if the United States and China engaged in any bilateral strategic or nuclear consultations.30 Despite improved relations today, distrust between Beijing and Tokyo remains strong, and many in Japan’s defense community view China’s rapidly modernizing military as their primary threat.

Future of the Korean Peninsula. Any eventual reunification of the Korean peninsula could further induce Japan to reconsider its nuclear stance. If the two Koreas unify while North Korea still holds nuclear weapons and the new state opts to keep a nuclear arsenal, Japan may face a different calculation. Indeed, some Japanese analysts have claimed that a nuclear-armed reunified Korea would be more of a threat than a nuclear-armed North Korea.

Such a nuclear decision would depend on a variety of factors: the political orientation of the new country, its relationship with the United States, and how a reunified government approached its historically difficult ties with Japan. Although South Korea and Japan normalized relations in 1965, many Koreans harbor resentment of Japan’s harsh colonial rule of the peninsula from 1910-1945. If the closely neighboring Koreans exhibited hostility toward Japan, it may feel more compelled to develop a nuclear weapons capability. The United States is likely to be involved in any possible Korean unification because of its military alliance with South Korea and its leading role in the Six-Party Talks. U.S. contingency planning for future scenarios on the Korean peninsula should take into account Japan’s calculus with regard to nuclear weapon development.

Japan’s International Reputation. If Japan decided to go nuclear, its international reputation as a principled advocate for non-proliferation would erode. Many observers say this would rule out Japan’s ambition of eventually holding a seat on the United Nations Security Council. Japan, of course, would bear the brunt of these consequences, but it could be harmful to U.S. interests as well. Japan is generally viewed overwhelmingly positively by the international community, and its support for U.S.-led international issues can lend credibility and legitimacy to efforts such as democracy promotion, peacekeeping missions, environmental cooperation, and multilateral defense exercises, to name a few.

Damage to Global Non-Proliferation Regime. Japan’s development of its own nuclear arsenal could also have damaging impact on U.S. nonproliferation policy. It would be more difficult for the United States to convince non-nuclear weapon states to keep their non-nuclear status or to persuade countries such as North Korea to give up their weapons programs. The damage to the NPT as a guarantor of nuclear power for peaceful use and the IAEA as an inspection regime could be irreparable if Japan were to leave or violate the treaty. If a close ally under its nuclear umbrella chose to acquire the bomb, perhaps other countries enjoying a strong bilateral relationship with the United States would be less inhibited in pursuing their own option. It could also undermine confidence in U.S. security guarantees more
generally.

21 Hajime Izumi and Katsuhisa Furukawa. “Not Going Nuclear: Japan’s Response to North Korea’s Nuclear Test,” Nautilus Institute Policy Forum Online. July 19, 2007.
22 “U.S. Is Japan’s Nuclear Shield, Rice Says,” Los Angeles Times. October 19, 2006.
23 Brad Glosserman, “Japan Peers Into the Abyss,” PacNet Newsletter #20. March 20, 2008.
24 Brad Glosserman, “Nuclear Basics for the Alliance,” PacNet Newsletter #21. April 19, 2007.
25 For more information, see CRS Report RS22684, Potential F-22 Raptor Export to Japan, by Christopher Bolkcom and Emma Chanlett-Avery.
26 Kurt Campbell and Tsuyoshi Sunohara. “Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable,” The Nuclear Tipping Point, 2004.
27 The principle of “collective self-defense” raises questions about how closely the United States and Japan can integrate missile defense cooperation. The term comes from Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which provides that member nations may exercise the rights of both individual and collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs. The Japanese government maintains that Japan has the sovereign right to engage in collective self-defense, but a 1960 decision by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau interpreted the constitution to forbid collective actions because it would require considering the defense of other countries, not just the safety of Japan itself. The ban on collective self-defense raises questions about how Japanese commanders will gauge whether American forces or Japan itself is being targeted. Under the current interpretation, Japanese forces could not legally respond if the United States were attacked.
28 Masahiro Matsumura. “Prudence and Realism in Japan’s Nuclear Options,” Brookings Institution website, January 16, 2008.
29 See Richard Lowry, “Time for the Sun to Rise,” National Review. July 4, 2005.
30 Katsuhisa Furukawa. “Japanese Perspectives on Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation,” Research Institute of Science and Technology for Society powerpoint presentation. November 29, 2007. For more on existing U.S.-PRC nuclear cooperation, see CRS Report RL33192, U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, by Shirley Kan.

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