B787の試験は失敗したらしい。
報道を読み限り、翼に静加重をかけた時に、付け根付近の機体側面に
1-2平方インチのストレス(ヒビ、ワレ等)がみつかったらしい。
原因は、ボーイングが提供する総合設計システムとMHI、FHIのシステムの
運用の仕方にあるようだ。
B787の納期が延期することで、発注が取り消され、不景気なうえに、
製造なしでは、ストライキは逆効果になったと思う。
C-XでもMHI製造部分の機体強度が足りなくて静加重試験を失敗し、
KHIが防衛庁から違約金の支払いを迫られた報道があった。
ボーイングは、一方的に、MHIとFHIを責めているわけではないようだ。
でも、印象は悪いだろう。
Money Minute: Boeing's 787 Delays The Associated Press
---７８７型１５機の発注キャンセル、１５機の納入延期 カンタス---
2009.06.27 Web posted at: 13:51 JST Updated - CNNMoney
http://www.cnn.co.jp/business/CNN200906270006.html
（CNNMoney） オーストラリア最大手、カンタス航空は２７日までに、米航空機製造大手ボーイングに発注していた次世代旅客機７８７（ドリームライナー）型１５機をキャンセルしたと発表した。また、別の１５機の納入を４年間延期した。
景気後退、金融危機を背景に、航空業界が乗客減など厳しい経営環境にあることが原因。これらの発注は２００５年に行っていたが、２カ月前からキャンセル、納入延期で交渉していた。
同航空による７８７型の発注総数はこれで計５０機となった。カンタスはまた、欧州エアバス・インダストリーに対し総２階建ての超大型旅客機Ａ３８０の４機の引き渡しを１年延ばすよう要請した。
同社は今年４月、収益の予想額を下方修正し、一部機材の就航停止や５％の人員削減を発表していた。
---Boeing’s 787 Integrated Supply Chain At Work to Fix Latest Problem---
June 24th, 2009
http://agmetalminer.com/2009/06/24/boeing%E2%80%99s-787-integrated-supply-chain-at-work-to-fix-latest-problem/
Boeing announced yesterday another delay in its long awaited first flight citing a need to reinforce a side-of-body section of the plane according to this story in Crain’s Chicago. Having listened in on Boeing’s special webcast to talk about the delay we thought it might make sense to look at this not from a shareholder or stock analyst angle but from a supply chain management and strategic sourcing one. And since this latest delay (and solution) relates to a handful of metal parts, we wanted to better understand Boeing’s process for identifying and resolving issues and then comment on the delay itself.
During standard test procedures, Boeing identified ‘stress’ in the side body structure where the side body joins the wing. In particular, where the upper portion of the wing and the side of body join totaling 18 locations on either side of the plane. The areas are small, one to two square inches but involve an integrated design solution as the wings come from Mitsubishi and the side of body from Fuji. The parts needed to resolve the issue will either be made from titanium or aluminum. Boeing stated that they have “staged material in our fabrication division” and the likely solution can be “retrofitted in production plans” keeping everything else “in-flow.”
Boeing made much mention of two supply chain concepts - “re-anchoring the model” and “staying in process,” worthy of some comments. To outside observers, these two points may sound like a bunch of hooey but in fact, remain critical to the overall product development process, production process, certification and quality processes. Let’s examine each in turn. The notion of “re-anchoring the model” refers to the predictive models developed by Boeing (and key integrated supply chain partners) and the testing of those models via static and flight testing. In this case, the stress detected on these structures during static testing suggested the results diverged from the model enough to cause the design engineers to “re-anchor” the model by reinforcing the structure. Because this is an “integrated design issue” the solution requires a close collaboration among Mitsubishi, Fuji and Boeing.
Now for the concept of “staying in process.” Despite the tremendous pressure to launch products according to schedule and to what had been previously communicated to Wall Street, Boeing has consistently relied on its design and testing process to guide it’s actions. Big problems arise when activities and work get conducted “outside the process.” The process itself is what ensures quality.
In Boeing’s defense, the company pioneered the concept of cross-functional teams working to design and build key systems and components as part of the 777 program (incidentally, Boeing has received numerous awards for this process innovation). And again with the 787, we have a new production/design process in the form of external supplier collaboration, previously untested. Though this creates new challenges, it also provides benefits in that the key suppliers involved in the solution can work 24/7 to resolve issues.
All things being equal, I’d rather take a short term setback than suffer the consequences of not adhering to the process.
-Lisa Reisman
---Aerospace News boeingairplanemanufacturingairbusEADSSeattle---
Jun 23, 2009
http://blog.seattlepi.com/aerospace/archives/172036.asp
Boeing 787 Dreamliner delay: Customer reactions | Main | Want to check that bag? You can't, says Ryanair
Boeing 787 flight delay: technical details and Q&A transcript
After Boeing announced on Tuesday that first flight of the 787 would slip again, it held a conference call with analysts and members of the media.
Specific technical details emerged during the call.
I've pulled out some of the pertinent questions and answers for you right here. If you want to read the full transcript, you can do so by clicking this link: The Boeing Company Conference Call to Discuss Postponement of 787 First Flight
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Question: Joseph Campbell - Barclays Capital - Analyst
Just again back on the nature of the problem and where it is, can you -- is this problem isolated to a single structure? So like is it -- I mean is it the Alenia piece? Is it the wing box from Fuji? Or does it involve stresses on several supplier components? Is it both starboard and port so that this is something that's symmetrical around the aircraft? Or is it a single sided kind of issue?
Pat Shanahan - The Boeing Company - Airplane Programs VP and General Manager
I will jump in first and Scott can provide additional color. So it's multiple structures and it's an integrated design. So it's both the wing out of Mitsubishi and the side-of-body, which is part of the center section out of Fuji. And the design and the models are developed concurrently by Boeing, Fuji and Mitsubishi. That is the nature of this integrated structure. So as we work through the solution, we will involve Fuji, Mitsubishi, and Boeing, in developing a comprehensive long-term answer. Scott?
Joseph Campbell - Barclays Capital - Analyst
And it's both sides, but not the Alenia structure?
Scott Fancher - The Boeing Company - 787 Vice President and General Manager
Correct, and it is symmetric. As Pat mentioned, every -- all of our partners that have structure in this area and participated in the design are on the team to determine what the modifications are for this area.
Joseph Campbell - Baclays Capital - Analyst
So just to not -- hopefully this can be the end of this. Somebody asks before it was along the entire wing, so it's -- if you were to describe from the aft to tail or under the belly or wherever these are located, is it possible to take the multiple several inch -- one or two square inch places and identify how many of them are there and from the furthest point away, how big is the section affected?
Scott Fancher - The Boeing Company - 787 Vice President and General Manager
This is Scott Fancher. Let me try and take a crack at that. As we mentioned earlier, we are talking on a one or two square inch area. It is along the side-of-body join between the wing and the side-of-body and particularly -- and specifically limited to the upper portion of where the wing and side-of-body join. And about 18 locations on either side of the aircraft for a total of 36 locations. The exact number may change a little bit as we analyze it, but that's approximately the number.
And I really want to emphasize we are talking about a one or two square inch area along that upper wing join area in multiple locations. This is not a problem that extends out the wings or down into -- it is into the aircraft. It's a very limited area that needs structural reinforcement. The modifications, again to emphasize, we are talking about a handful of parts at each location and each one of those parts you could literally hold in your hand. They will be about the size of your hand or smaller. So not complicated by any means.
Paul Merrion - Crain's Capital Business - Media
Hi. I just wanted to go to the issue of the credibility in the company's schedule and predictions of schedule. You knew about this as of late last month, you said. Why wait until now to say anything at all about it? Including when the world's attention was on Boeing last week at the Paris Air Show.
Scott Carson - The Boeing Company - President and CEO
Paul, this is Scott Carson. When we were at Paris last week we had been through the preliminary analysis of the data and were of a mind that the airplane could enter flight test with a credible flight test envelope as we worked relatively minor modifications.
The work done by the team through the week last week narrowed the envelope to the point where on Friday we determined that to fly would be such a small envelope for us that it would be an interesting exercise in having the airplane in the air but not particularly useful in terms of preparing the airplane for certification.
So at that point is when we made the call to delay the process, identify the fix, test the fix, install the fix, and then enter a flight test program that is fully robust.
Paul Merrion - Crain's Chicago Business - Media
So what would have been the worst case if you had flown? Are we talking about cracks in the fuselage or the wings falling off or what -- if you hadn't made this fix before flying?
Scott Fancher - The Boeing Company - 787 Vice President and General Manager
The answer is our assessment is likely nothing would have happened. This is an issue where stress concentrations departed from the model. Absent being able to anchor those two pieces of data together with confidence based upon our design process, we would have had to reduce the flight envelope we were willing to fly and that gets you into the line of logic that Scott just outlined for you.
So it really isn't a matter of yes and no. It is gee, because we've seen this departure and haven't been able to anchor the data back to the model with sufficient confidence, we need to narrow our margins and that led us down the path that Scott described.
Pat Shanahan - The Boeing Company - Airplane Programs VP and General Manager
And we are always staying in process. And when the process says stop, we stop.
Scott Carson - The Boeing Company - President and CEO
Absolutely, absolutely.
Howard Rubel - Jefferies & Co. - Analyst
Thank you very much. I mean you are talking about a number of parts that sound like you could put them in a grocery bag but maybe 50 pounds, 60 pounds. But can you talk a little bit about the dollar outcome, Scott, that we are seeing here? Are we talking hundreds of millions of dollars or are we talking just a few million to get this started and fixed?
Scott Carson - The Boeing Company - President and CEO
Howard, I think it is premature to forecast where we are in dollars. We understand the nature of the fix and I would say the nature, not the specifics of the fix yet, because we have to complete the models, run those models, and then test the solution.
As we get through those steps, I think we will be in a better place to talk about the magnitude of the dollars. The fix itself does not appear to be a big dollar item. Obviously we need to understand the implications of the flight test program and first deliveries
to assess that.
Howard Rubel - Jefferies & Co. - Analyst
Are we going to see though a day-for-day delay with this and the whole schedule or are there some other items that you might want to also incorporate to increase the margin for discovering additional unknowns?
Scott Carson - The Boeing Company - President and CEO
We are going to continue to exercise the test program as Scott Fancher described in his comments. So whether it is day-for-day, I think again hard for us to call at this moment. We do believe we will be using the time productively however.
Howard Rubel - Jefferies & Co. - Analyst
So I just want to go back though the dollar amount. The fix itself just the titanium parts that you are talking about, is immaterial to the price of the airplane.
Scott Carson - The Boeing Company - President and CEO
Correct.
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