2010年3月7日日曜日

OPLAN8010

OPLAN8010の一部を解析したようだ。
 OPLAN8010が、潜在的な核攻撃の対象として5カ国と非国家主体の計六つ
を記載していることが分かった。計画の関連文書を入手したFASが明らか
にした。
 OPLAN8010の中で、「潜在的な六つの敵」について、任務の分析や見直し
の進展状況などを説明する記載が見つかった。

潜在的な攻撃対象国
中国、イラン、北朝鮮、ロシア、シリアと
「テロ組織が国家と共謀して大量破壊兵器による破壊的攻撃を仕掛ける場合」

攻撃目標
「大量破壊兵器に関するインフラ」、「軍や国家の指導層」等

FASによる「先制核攻撃兵器から最小の抑止まで」にも、潜在的な攻撃対象
国は、中国、イラン、北朝鮮、ロシア、シリアと911タイプの脅威となって
いる。
核兵器の被害、弾頭の改良等を含めた戦略があるようだ。
オバマは核をどうしたいのだろう。

米トマホーク廃棄へ

---米国:核攻撃「六つの敵」 戦略軍計画、関連文書で判明---
毎日新聞 2010年2月28日 東京朝刊
http://mainichi.jp/select/world/news/20100228ddm007030083000c.html

 【ワシントン古本陽荘】米軍の核戦略を統括する戦略軍(STRATCOM、ネブラスカ州)の包括的な作戦計画「OPLAN8010」が、潜在的な核攻撃の対象として5カ国と非国家主体の計六つを記載していることが27日、分かった。計画の関連文書を入手した米科学者連盟(FAS)のハンス・クリステンセン氏が毎日新聞に明らかにした。
 OPLAN8010は、米軍による核攻撃の具体的な作戦を網羅。計画そのものは当面、秘密扱いとされている。クリステンセン氏は、一部が黒塗りされた説明資料の入手に成功した。
 この中で、「潜在的な六つの敵」について、任務の分析や見直しの進展状況などを説明する記載が見つかった。国名はマジックで黒塗りされていた。クリステンセン氏は文字の一部や文字数の推測に加え、軍当局者への聞き取りや過去の経緯なども考慮した結果、潜在的な攻撃対象は中国、イラン、北朝鮮、ロシア、シリアの5カ国と、「テロ組織が国家と共謀して大量破壊兵器による破壊的攻撃を仕掛ける場合」と分析した。
 また、OPLAN8010が攻撃目標として、「大量破壊兵器に関するインフラ」「軍や国家の指導層」などを想定していることも判明した。ただ、既に変更された可能性もあるという。
 オバマ大統領は、核兵器の役割を縮小すると表明済み。米政府は新しい核態勢見直し(NPR)の報告書を作成している。3月1日に発表予定だったが、意見集約に手間取り、発表は1カ月程度ずれ込む見通しだ。
 現行のOPLAN8010が化学兵器や生物兵器を含む大量破壊兵器を広く核攻撃の対象ととらえているのに対し、新たなNPRでは通常兵器に核兵器の役割を代替させる方向で検討が進んでいる。
 NPRがまとまってから新しい作戦計画が作成されるまでには、2~3年程度かかるのが通例。その間は、OPLAN8010が米軍の核攻撃作戦の基軸であり続ける。OPLAN8010は08年12月に作成され、オバマ大統領就任後の09年2月に改定されている。


---From counterforce to minimal deterrence---
May 5, 2009
By Hans M. Kristensen,Matthew G. McKinzie,Robert S. Norris,Ivan Oelrich
http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/publications1/Brief2009_MORS-050509.pdf

Briefing to MORS nuclear online workshop

Presidential Context
Two decades after the end of the Cold War, President Barack Obama has set the United States on a new nuclear path (Prague speech):
“seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons”
“ignore the voices who tell us that the world cannot change”
“take concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons”
“To put an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same.”
A follow-on agreement to START “will set the stage for further cuts, and we will seek to
include all nuclear weapons states in this endeavor.”
Yet at the same time:
“As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and
effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies”
How should U.S. nuclear policy change to help facilitate this transition?

Today’s Nuclear Posture
U.S. Nuclear Forces 2009 Nuclear Planning
Weapons     Estimated Strategic war plan: OPLAN 8010-08
Category    Warheads Strategic Deterrence and Global
Operational   2,700 Strike (December 2008)
Strategic   2,200 Contains a “family of plans” against
six adversaries: China, Iran, North
Tactical    500     Korea, Russia, Syria, 9/11-type
              threats
Reserve     2,500    Compared with SIOP, OPLAN 8010
              “provides more flexible options” for
Total Stockpile 5,200   “a wider range of contingencies.”
              Includes nuclear and conventional
Awaiting 4,200    weapons.
Dismantlement
Total Inventory 9,400

Nuclear Deterrence Overcapacity
The current nuclear posture - even if reduced to 1,000-1,500 operationally deployed strategic warheads - has enormous overcapacity beyond what is needed for basic nuclear deterrence.
1979 OTA study used seven Poseidon missiles with 64 40-kt warheads and three Minuteman III ICBMs with nine 170-kt warheads to attack 24 Soviet oil refineries and 34 petroleum storage sites. The 73 weapons destroyed 73 percent of the Soviet petroleum refining capacity and 16 percent of Soviet storage capacity. Many of the refineries were in or near cities and thus between 836,000 and 1,458,000 people were killed, depending upon whether the people were in single or multistory buildings. Injuries would total an additional 2.6 to 3.6 million people.
“Destroying 73 percent of refining capacity would force the economy onto a crisis footing, curtailing choices and consumer goods, dropping the standard of living from austere to grim and setting back Soviet economic progress by many years.”
OTA, The Effects of Nuclear War, May 1979

Cold War-Like Nuclear Targeting
Current nuclear targeting policy is based on guidance and planning assumptions that are deeply rooted in Cold War warfighting mentality:
NUWEP 04: “U.S. nuclear forces must be capable of, and be seen to be capable of destroying those critical war-making and war-supporting assets and capabilities that a potential enemy leadership values most and that it would rely on to achieve its own objectives in a post-war world.”
Nuclear doctrine examples from Deterrence Operations JOC, Dec. 2006:
“Nuclear weapons threaten destruction of an adversary’s most highly valued assets, including adversary WMD capabilities, critical industries, key resources, and means of political organization and control (including the adversary leadership itself). This includes destruction of targets otherwise invulnerable to conventional attack, e.g., hard and deeply buried facilities, ‘location uncertainty’ targets, etc.” Nuclear weapons “allow the US to rapidly accomplish the wholesale disruption of an adversary nation-state with limited US national resources.”
Nuclear weapons can also “constrain an adversary’s WMD employment through US counterforce strikes aimed at destroying adversary escalatory options.”
Mirrors Cold War targeting policy at lower levels.

Mission Creep
Although end of Cold War resulted to significant changes in guidance, targets, and weapons requirement, proliferation fear and 9/11 led to wider targeting:
! Expansion from deterring nuclear attack to deterring WMD
! Expansion from deterring Russia and China to deterring six adversaries
Declaratory policy is very broad:
“the United States has made clear for many years that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force to the use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, our people, our forces and our friends and allies. Additionally, the United States will hold any state, terrorist group, or other non-state actor fully accountable for supporting or enabling terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts.”
Stephen Hadley, remarks to CISAC, February 8, 2008 (emphasis added)
“New Triad” philosophy blurs distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons and missions making it more difficult to signal clearly who is intended to be deterred with what and for what purpose.

Cold War-Like Deterrence Requirements
Main justification for nuclear forces is “deterrence” but deterrence is rarely defined,except implicitly by assumptions carried over from the Cold War.
Deterrence by threat of retaliation is simple: must be able to threaten enough pain to make seizing a prize seem like a bad deal.
During the bi-polar, ideological Cold War, the prize was the future of the world and the pain required was near-total, hence “assured destruction.” The level of pain needed today is tied to the much lower stakes in play today.
During Cold War, only nuclear weapons could threaten necessary levels of pain,thus the persistent unstated equivalence of deterrence and nuclear deterrence.
Today, conventional weapons are more effective and the pain requirements are lower, so conventional weapons alone may be adequate.
When determining deterrence requirements today, always ask: who is being deterred? What action is being deterred? What are the stakes involved? What deterrence mission cannot be met by non-nuclear means?

Minimal Deterrence
A new nuclear targeting policy is needed in the transition period where the United States and Russia move toward deep cuts. Minimal Deterrence would retain a basic secured nuclear retaliatory capability to deter nuclear attack, yet:
Reduce missions for nuclear weapons to deterring nuclear use only
Remove planning for first-strikes
Constrained second-use policy
No nuclear forces on alert
Separation of nuclear and conventional forces
Objective of Minimal Deterrence is to “turn off” Cold War dynamic that continues to generate unnecessarily offensive postures and high requirements for capability and operations for both American and Russian forces.
Nuclear deterrence must be separated from warfighting. A Minimal Deterrence seeks no “advantage” or damage limitation in strike scenarios, only a secured retaliatory capability.
Minimal Deterrence creates a stable resting spot that minimizes the salience and danger of remaining nuclear weapons and allows all of the world’s disparate nuclear powers to come into a stable equilibrium before moving to the last step or denuclearization.

Nominal Target Set
We examined 12 nominal industrial targets in Russia by using HPAC to calculate estimated damage and casualties caused by nuclear weapons of different yield on nearby population centers. To minimize civilian casualties to the extent possible,we chose the optimum Height-of-Burst (HOB) and lowest possible yield to destroy the facilities. The following example shows attack calculations on the Omsk Refinery in southerwestern Siberia:

Minimal Deterrence, not City Busting
Part of the response to our study has been that Minimal Deterrence and the targeting of industrial infrastructure facilities would drive U.S. toward city busting and significantly more collateral damage. This is not correct because:
Our targeting proposal explicitly avoids targeting cities.
Current counterforce targeting already accepts significant civilian casualties.
Previous and current counterforce targeting policy also threatens destruction of an adversary’s “critical industries” and “key resources.”
Deterrence Operations JOC, Dec. 2006, p. 40.
Current targeting doctrine states that “threatened use of Global Strike will be more effective to the degree that both US and adversary decision-makers believe the effects can be achieved without inflicting significant collateral damage.”
Deterrence Operations JOC, Dec. 2006, p. 40.

Relaxing Nuclear Requirements
A Minimal Deterrence posture would permit relaxation of warhead requirements.
With no requirement to destroy hardened silos or underground structures, simple adjustments to the “legacy warheads” would me more than adequate to carry out the new targeting policy.
About one-third of the warheads in current stockpile already have low-yield options (B61, W80, B83).
Others (W76, W78, W87, W88) can get it by disabling the secondary, leaving them either with a boosted fission or pure fission option.
No new warheads would be needed. Performance margins could be relaxed.
Pressure for new or enhanced warheads would ease. Opens up new possibilities for reducing posture and deployments.
Minimal Deterrence supports President’s goal of the United States taking “concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons,” “put an end to Cold War thinking,”“reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy,” and not authorizing new nuclear weapons.

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