2010年5月21日金曜日

命中率20%以下の抑止力

SM3の命中率は20%以下らしい。
 米国のMDで用いられるSM3の弾頭命中率は10-20%と極めて低く、事実上、
敵の核ミサイル迎撃には役に立たない。
SM3の命中率を84%とする米国防総省の公式発表とは大きく異なる。
迎撃実験に用いられた仮想の敵ミサイル10基のうち4基は、模型の弾頭すら
搭載していなかった。

10回の試射
正確に命中したケースは1-2件
残りは胴体に命中。ミサイルが当初の軌道を外れ、不特定の場所に落下。

こんごうによるハワイ沖のSM3試射は、模擬ミサイルに当りやすい加工
(熱源強化、脆弱な筐体、時刻調整、軌道調整等)を行い、高命中率との
発表があった。それでも、ちょうかいは命中できなかった。

米陸軍は、湾岸戦争時のサウジでのパトリオットの命中率を80%以下。
イスラエルでの命中率を50%以下としているが、もっと低いようだ。
弾頭の破壊は9%以下とのこと。

SM3は、テポドン2号には届かないし、命中率が低い。
一部の議員の間では、こう言うのを抑止力と呼ぶらしい。
THAADはもっと長距離を飛ぶので、命中率はもっと下がるのだろうか。
もしかして、SM3は命中率が低いので、連射が必要だから、もっと
購入しろと言う米軍産複合体と米政府の作戦か。

こんごう ミサイル迎撃試験成功
米偵察衛星SM3で撃墜
ちょうかい 使えないSM3を装備認定
テポドン2 迎撃候補
みょうこう SM3迎撃成功
在日米軍に抑止力はあるのか


---米ミサイル防衛に重大な欠陥、「技術的な神話」と米研究者---
2010年05月19日 18:00 発信地:ワシントンD.C./米国
http://www.afpbb.com/article/politics/2728179/5776106

【5月19日 AFP】米コーネル大(Cornell University)とマサチューセッツ工科大(MIT)の科学者2人が、米政府のミサイル防衛計画は根拠の薄い「技術的な神話」に基づくもので、迎撃実験の大半は向かってくるミサイル弾頭を打ち落とせず失敗に終わっていると指摘する共同研究を発表した。

 コーネル大のジョージ・ルイス(George Lewis)氏とMITのセオドア・ポストル(Theodore Postol)氏は、軍縮・軍備管理問題の専門誌「アームズ・コントロール・トゥデイ(Arms Control Today)」最新号に『Flawed and Dangerous US Missile Defense Plan(欠陥だらけで危険なアメリカのミサイル防衛計画)』と題する報告書を発表した。

 2人は、大陸弾道間ミサイルによる攻撃を阻止するために開発された海上配備型迎撃ミサイル「SM-3」の迎撃実験10回分のデータを検証し、実際に模擬弾頭への直撃に成功した例は1~2回にすぎないと結論した。これが実戦であれば「弾頭は破壊されることなく標的に向かって進み、8~9割はたどり着いて爆発する」とルイス氏は警告する。

 米国防総省は、02~09年にかけて行った迎撃実験について「成功だった」と発表してきたが、これに対し2人は「作り話以外の何ものでもない。このような技術的神話に従った政策戦略では、外交政策が大失敗しかねない」と報告書で指摘した。また早期警戒衛星やレーダーによる警戒網によるミサイル追跡の正確性、あるいはミサイル以外の物体の残がいやデコイ(おとり)とミサイルを識別する能力に疑問も示している。

 しかし米ミサイル防衛庁(Missile Defense Agency、MDA)は18日、同報告は「不備が多く不正確で、誤解を招くものだ」と反論した。


---ミサイル防衛:SM3の命中率は低い!?---
記事入力 : 2010/05/19 10:25:31
金旻九(キム・ミング)記者 朝鮮日報/朝鮮日報日本語版
http://www.chosunonline.com/news/20100519000033

「事実上、役に立たない」 米科学者らが報告書
国防総省、「事実の歪曲」と反論
 米国のミサイル防衛(MD)で用いられる海上配備型迎撃ミサイル(SM3)の弾頭命中率は10-20%と極めて低く、事実上、敵の核ミサイル迎撃には役に立たない-。米国の科学者らが最近、こうした内容を含む研究報告書を発表した。これは、SM3の命中率を84%とする米国防総省の公式発表とは大きく異なるもので、波紋を呼ぶものとみられる。
 米マサチューセッツ工科大(MIT)のセオドア・ポストル教授とコーネル大のジョージ・ルイス先任研究院は、軍縮専門誌「アームズコントロール・トゥデイ」最新号(5月)に発表した研究報告書で、「米国防総省が“命中した”と発表した過去10件のSM3迎撃実験の資料を分析した結果、実際にミサイルの弾頭に正確に命中したケースは1-2件に過ぎなかった」と主張した。残りの迎撃ミサイルは、最も小さなミサイルの弾頭ではなく、胴体に命中したもので、事実上の失敗だ指摘した。
 ミサイルの弾頭を正確に迎撃した場合、上空で爆破され消滅するが、胴体に命中すると、ミサイルが当初の軌道を外れ、不特定の場所に落下する。このミサイルに、破壊力の弱い通常型の弾頭が積まれていても、大きな問題にはならないが、核弾頭が搭載されていた場合、ミサイルが墜落した地域では、核爆発による大規模な人命の損失が生じかねない。
 MD迎撃ミサイルの開発については、「飛行中の弾頭に銃弾を命中させる」という難しい技術が必要なため、不可能な目標だという批判を受けてきた。しかし米国防総省は今年4月、イージス艦から発射したSM3ミサイルが、数度にわたる迎撃実験で80%以上の命中率を示した、と発表した。
 大統領候補時代にMD計画を批判していたバラク・オバマ大統領も昨年9月、SM3を主軸とする新たなMD計画を発表した。さらに、米国の海軍と日本の海上自衛隊はSM3をMDの主力兵器として採択したほか、イスラエルもこの迎撃ミサイルの購入を進めているといわれている。
 米国防総省は、ポストル教授の研究チームが発表した分析報告書に直ちに反論した。パトリック・オライリー・ミサイル防衛局長は、ニューヨーク・タイムズの紙面で、「ポストル教授の分析は誤っており、不正確で、事実を歪曲(わいきょく)している」と語った。しかし、過去10件の実験で迎撃ミサイルが正確に弾頭に命中したかどうかについては、明らかにしていない。また、迎撃実験に用いられた仮想の敵ミサイル10基のうち4基は、模型の弾頭すら搭載していなかったことが分かった。
 米議会下院のジョン・ティアニー国家安全保障小委委員長は、「この問題に関して、議会レベルでの真相究明調査を検討したい」と語った。


--- Obama's 'Proven' SM-3 Missile Interceptor May Only Succeed 20 Percent of the Time, Say Physicists---
By Clay Dillow Posted 05.18.2010 at 11:36 am
http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2010-05/obamas-proven-missile-interceptor-may-only-succeed-20-percent-time

The Obama administration has worked tirelessly towards nuke reductions in recent months, signing an arms control treaty with Russia and ratcheting up the rhetoric -- and the promises of further sanctions -- towards Iran. But at the center of President Obama's arms reduction campaign is an antimissile defense rocket known as the SM-3, and depending on who you ask the interceptor is either "proven and effective," or an absolute failure 80 percent of the time.

Two physicists from MIT and Cornell published a new analysis of the SM-3 in the May issue of Arms Control Today critiquing 10 tests of the SM-3 conducted between 2002 and 2009. The Missile Defense Agency and the Pentagon have hailed these tests as successes, with the interceptors nailing their targets 84 percent of the time. But MIT's Dr. Thomas Postol and Cornell's Dr. George Lewis claim that success rate is closer to 20 percent.

At issue is whether or not the SM-3 is actually capable of destroying the warhead aboard an ICBM as opposed to simply destroying the launch vehicle. The interceptor contains what's known as an exoatmospheric kill vehicle, which uses an onboard telescope to look across space for telltale signs of an incoming rocket. Once the target is acquired, the kill vehicle slams into it, destroying it via impact.

Postol and Lewis argue that missiles -- particularly ICBMs -- are big vehicles, with their warheads being but small parts of the whole. Though the SM-3 indeed makes contact with incoming threats with regular frequency, it only struck the warhead directly in tests twice out of ten tries. That means the warhead could still be loose in the atmosphere, free to fall wherever gravity takes it. And, as Postol points out to the NYT, if we merely nudge a missile headed for Wall Street off course enough to hit Brooklyn, we can't call that a success.

The Pentagon claims that in tests their mock warheads were destroyed in the breakup of the launch vehicle, regardless of whether the SM-3 scored a direct hit to the warhead of simply impacted the carrier vehicle. But Postol and Lewis argue that mock warheads are far more fragile than actual nukes, which are designed to withstand the heat and stresses of space flight.

As such, the difference of a few inches could be the difference between a kill for the SM-3 and a nuclear strike for the enemy. Those are an important few inches, not just for the future of the SM-3 but for Obama's nuclear policy. The SM-3 is at the core of his nuclear agenda regarding Russia, Israel, and Iran, not to mention his rationale for cutting America's nuclear arsenal.


---Review Cites Flaws in U.S. Antimissile Program---
By WILLIAM J. BROAD and DAVID E. SANGER
Published: May 17, 2010
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/18/world/18missile.html?pagewanted=1&hp

President Obama’s plans for reducing America’s nuclear arsenal and defeating Iran’s missiles rely heavily on a new generation of antimissile defenses, which last year he called “proven and effective.”

His confidence in the heart of the system, a rocket-powered interceptor known as the SM-3, was particularly notable because as a senator and presidential candidate he had previously criticized antimissile arms. But now, a new analysis being published by two antimissile critics, at M.I.T. and Cornell, casts doubt on the reliability of the new weapon.

Mr. Obama’s announcement of his new antimissile plan in September was based on the Pentagon’s assessment that the SM-3, or Standard Missile 3, had intercepted 84 percent of incoming targets in tests. But a re-examination of results from 10 of those apparently successful tests by Theodore A. Postol and George N. Lewis, being published this month, finds only one or two successful intercepts - for a success rate of 10 to 20 percent.

Most of the approaching warheads, they say, would have been knocked off course but not destroyed. While that might work against a conventionally armed missile, it suggests that a nuclear warhead might still detonate. At issue is whether the SM-3 needs to strike and destroy the warhead of a missile - as the Pentagon says on its Web site.

“The system is highly fragile and brittle and will intercept warheads only by accident, if ever,” said Dr. Postol, a former Pentagon science adviser who forcefully criticized the performance of the Patriot antimissile system in the 1991 Persian Gulf war.

In interviews and a statement, the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency strongly defended the SM-3s testing record, and said that the analysis by Dr. Postol, an M.I.T. physicist, and Dr. Lewis, a Cornell physicist, was fundamentally mistaken.

“The allegation is wrong,” Richard Lehner, an agency spokesman, said Wednesday. He said the SM-3 is “attaining test scores that many other Defense Department programs aspire to attain.”

Even so, the Pentagon later admitted that 4 of the 10 analyzed flight tests carried no mock warheads at all.

The White House declined to comment on the critique of the SM-3 and referred questions to the Pentagon.

The political implications of the critique are potentially large. Democrats, traditional critics of missile defense, have been largely silent about Mr. Obama’s enthusiasm for this new generation, which for the moment is aimed only at shorter- and mid-range missiles, rather than ones that fly between continents.

During the campaign, Mr. Obama repeatedly criticized what he called President George W. Bush’s haste to deploy unproven antimissile arms. He vowed that as president, he would assure that any defensive shield would meet rigorous standards of testing and effectiveness.

Since last fall, Mr. Obama’s antimissile goals have expanded to include not only countering Iranian missiles, but creating a rationale for deep cuts in the nation’s nuclear arsenal and ultimately for prompting foes to abandon their missile programs.

The deployment of the SM-3 is also seen as essential to convincing Israel that the United States has an effective technology to contain Iran, even if the Iranians obtain a nuclear weapon.

The dispute between the academics and the Pentagon centers on whether it is enough for a speeding interceptor to hit the body of a spent rocket moving through outer space or whether it must hit the attached warhead. Dr. Postol says the SM-3 interceptor must shatter the warhead directly, and public statements of the Pentagon agency seem to suggest that it agrees.

“The interceptors,” the agency Web site says in its basic explanation of antimissile goals, “ram the warhead at a very high closing speed, destroying the target.”

Skeptics generally hold that the antimissile job is so daunting - what the Pentagon calls hitting a bullet with a bullet - that managers and contractors easily fall prey to exaggerating test results.

But technologists call it increasingly doable. Compared with the Bush administration’s land-based system, the SM-3 is fairly small, quickly deployable on ships and has a better reputation.

The interceptor holds what the Pentagon calls an exoatmospheric kill vehicle. In space, it peers through a telescope to guide itself toward the target, sensing telltale heat emanations and using a computer brain to fire thruster jets. The kill vehicle slams into the target and destroys it by force of impact.

Dr. Postol’s critics see him as a pessimist blind to antimissile progress, and his defenders view him as a seer of technical oversight.

During the 1991 Gulf war, the Army put the success rate of the Patriot at over 80 percent in Saudi Arabia and 50 percent in Israel. But Dr. Postol found that brilliant displays of antimissile fire and thunder hid repeated failures of the interceptors to knock out speeding warheads.

The SM-3 analysis of Dr. Postol and Dr. Lewis, “A Flawed and Dangerous U.S. Missile Defense Plan,” appears in the May issue of Arms Control Today, a publication of the Arms Control Association, a private group in Washington.

The study examined video images that the SM-3 kill vehicle took a split second before striking the target and that the Missile Defense Agency subsequently made public. The analysis looked at 10 tests between 2002 and 2009 - all of which the agency hailed as successful intercepts.

But the scientists found that the kill vehicle hit the warhead only once or twice. The rest of the time, the interceptor struck the rocket body - a much larger target.

In combat, the scientists added, “the warhead would have not been destroyed, but would have continued toward the target.”

In an interview, Dr. Postol said the antimissile blow might cause a warhead to fall short or give it an added nudge, with the exact site of the weapon’s impact uncertain.

“It matters if it’s Wall Street or Brooklyn,” he said, “but we won’t know in advance.”

The Pentagon’s rebuttal included a written one vetted by Lt. Gen. Patrick J. O’Reilly, director of the Missile Defense Agency, as well the office of the secretary of defense. It called the analysis “flawed, inaccurate and misleading” and said the alleged SM-3 failures were all, in fact, successes that “did exactly what was expected” as the kill vehicles hit “within inches of the expected impact point.”

But it offered little discussion of whether striking the rocket body in flight tests was sufficient grounds to claim overall success - a seemingly important point given that much of the agency’s public testimony centers on the necessity of hitting warheads to ensure their destruction.

In a series of e-mail messages, Mr. Lehner of the Missile Defense Agency offered more information. On Wednesday, he said the rocket’s violent breakup also demolished the warhead. Asked if the agency had evidence, he replied Thursday that readings from test sensors “prove conclusively” that mock warheads “were destroyed and were no longer a threat.”

Mr. Lehner added, however, that target missiles in 4 test flights carried no mock warheads, but rather “a nosecone with a weight up front for ballast.” The 4 flights with no warheads - which Dr. Postol and Dr. Lewis included in their analysis of 10 interceptions by the SM-3 - included 3 early ones and a flight last July, the most recent in their analysis.

Informed of the Pentagon’s response, Dr. Postol said he had no idea about the lack of warheads. He also questioned whether the destroyed warheads represented military designs or frail impostors. Real nuclear warheads streaking through the void of space are extremely rugged objects, designed to withstand the fiery heat of atmospheric re-entry as well as intense buffeting and shaking.

“A mock warhead may be extremely fragile compared to a real one,” Dr. Postol said.

Mr. Lehner disagreed. On Friday he called the fragility claim “absolutely not true.”

Representative John F. Tierney, a Massachusetts Democrat who is chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform national security subcommittee, said in a statement that the SM-3 reanalysis raised serious questions.

“Congress will need to look into them further,” he said. “The American people deserve to know about the system’s actual capabilities and have a right to expect that their tax dollars are being spent effectively.”

1 コメント:

匿名 さんのコメント...

この教授は昔からMD反対を唱えてますが、結構主張が怪しいです。SM3は海上配備なので、仮に胴体に当たったとしても海に落ちる可能性が高いかと。10%~20%は胴体に当たった数を入れてません。