2013年8月27日火曜日

NSA Programs Cover 75% of US Traffic

NSAの監視は、米国内ネットトラフィックの75%になるようだ。
NSAの監視ネットワークが、同国でのインターネット通信の約75%をカバー
する能力があると報じた。

NSA当局者や元当局者の話
・監視プログラム
 ATTが構築 Blarney,Fairview,Oakstar,Lithium,Stormbrew
 担当 Narus(Boeing子会社):装置
    Cisco Systems Juniper Networksら:コンテンツフィルタ
・カバー範囲が公式発表よりも広い。
・米国市民が送信した電子メールの一部が記録されているほか、インター
 ネット上でかけられた電話も監視されている。
・電話監視は通信会社の協力を通じて行われ、主に通信元や通信先が米国
 外、または米国のネットワークを通過した国外の通話を対象。
・国内のメールは、発信者や受信者に限らずメール本文も把握。

電話会社を通じて、傍受をしていたとのこと。
海底ケーブルにも仕掛けていたようだ。
もう少し、詳細な情報があればと思う。

英政府関係者から圧力がかかり、英報道機関はSnowdenから提供された情報
を破壊しようだ。
PCを二つに切断した写真が記載されていたが、HDDまたはSSDが見当たらな
い。没収か隠蔽かも不明。記者が、個人的にクラウドの複数の保存先へ
暗号をかけて保存すれば、物理的な部品を破壊しても意味はない。
ゴーストライタとして、国外の報道機関の電子版へ記事を投稿すれば、
英国内での活動も可能。

米国 秘密裁判所令状更新
XKeyScore
XKeyScore 日本の監視
Gmail Users Have No Expectation of Privacy



NSA Internet Spying at AT&T


Latest News Bulletin - NSA's Google: XKeyscore search engine for all private info


---「NSA情報収集、ネット通信の75%カバー可能」米紙---
2013.8.21 15:47
http://sankei.jp.msn.com/economy/news/130821/its13082115480000-n1.htm

 米紙ウォールストリート・ジャーナル(電子版)は20日、米国家安全保障局(NSA)による一般市民の電子メールなどを対象にした情報収集について、規模が「米政府の公式説明を上回っており、米国のインターネット通信の約75%に及ぶ能力がある」と報じた。
 現・元政府当局者の話に基づくとしている。それによると、外国との通信を監視しているとしたNSAの情報収集は、実際には発信、受信とも米国内のメールに及ぶことがあり、発信者や受信者に限らずメール本文も把握されていた。(共同)


---NSAの監視活動、米インターネット通信の75%をカバー=報道---
2013年 08月 21日 14:30 JST
http://jp.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idJPTYE97K03920130821

 [ニューヨーク 20日 ロイター] - 米ウォールストリート・ジャーナル(WSJ)紙は20日、米国家安全保障局(NSA)の監視ネットワークが、同国でのインターネット通信の約75%をカバーする能力があると報じた。
 WSJはNSA当局者や元当局者の話として、カバー範囲が公式発表よりも広いと報道。米国市民が送信した電子メールの一部が記録されているほか、インターネット上でかけられた電話も監視されているという。
 同紙によると、電話監視は通信会社の協力を通じて行われ、主に通信元や通信先が米国外、または米国のネットワークを通過した国外の通話を対象としている。ただ当局者らは、カバー範囲が広いことから、米国内でやりとりされる通話も傍受・収集できる可能性が高いと指摘した。


---NSA関連情報の入ったコンピュータを英政府捜査官が破壊--The Guardianが暴露---
Steven Musil (CNET News) 翻訳校正: 編集部 2013/08/20 15:05
http://japan.cnet.com/news/society/35036155/

 The Guardianの編集者であるAlan Rusbridger氏は、米国家安全保障局(NSA)の内部告発者であるEdward Snowden氏から提供された情報が含まれていたコンピュータを英国政府捜査官によって破壊された経緯をブログ記事で詳細に語った。同氏はこの出来事について、「The Guardianの長い歴史において極めて異様な瞬間だった」と表現している。
 Rusbridger氏の記事によると、2カ月ほど前に、Snowden氏から提供された書類を返却あるいは破棄するよう英国政府から圧力を受けるようになったという。問題の書類は、議論を呼んでいる米政府の監視活動に関する一連の記事の根拠となったものだ。その1カ月後に事態は深刻化し、Rusbridger氏はある政府関係者から電話で「お楽しみは終わりだ。われわれに例の文書を返して欲しい」と告げられたという。
 こうした要求は、「謎の英政府関係者」との一連の会合で繰り返されたという。Rusbridger氏はその会合で、これに従った場合、同紙はNSAの活動に関する調査や報告ができなくなると説明した。また、Rusbridger氏は英国の諜報機関である政府通信本部(GCHQ)の代表者とのこうした会合で、民間報道のグローバルな性質から、そのような破壊行為が見当違いであるという説明を試みた。
 現代における情報収集の手法を説明したにもかかわらず、「英政府は(コンピュータを破壊したことに)満足した」とRusbridger氏は記している。また、同氏らがこの「MacBook Pro」の残骸を片付けている時、政府捜査官の一人が「われわれはブラックホーク(軍用ヘリコプターの一種)を呼びつけることができる」とジョークを言ったという。
 米CNETはこの件についてGCHQにコメントを求めたが、現時点で回答は得られていない。
 Rusbridger氏は、この問題を明らかにしたブログで、The GuardianのGlenn Greenwald記者のパートナーが現地時間8月18日、ブラジルへ帰国途中、経由したロンドンのヒースロー空港で9時間にわたり拘束されたことについても異議を唱えた。
 Greenwald記者は、「英米の両政府がこうした戦術について、いかなる形であれ、(暴露された)これらの文書で明らかになっていることに関して、われわれが積極的な報道を続けるのを阻止したり脅しをかけたりすることができると信じているとすれば、思い違いも甚だしい。むしろ、それは逆効果にすぎず、われわれをさらに勇気づけることになる」と述べた。
 Rusbridger氏もこうした意見に同調している。
 「われわれは、Snowden氏の文書について、これからも辛抱強く、徹底した報道を続けていく。ただし、ロンドンからは発信しないつもりだ」(Rusbridger氏)


---New Details Show Broader NSA Surveillance Reach---
Updated August 20, 2013, 11:31 p.m. ET
By SIOBHAN GORMAN and JENNIFER VALENTINO-DEVRIES
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324108204579022874091732470.html?KEYWORDS=nsa+75

Programs Cover 75% of Nation's Traffic, Can Snare Emails

WASHINGTON-The National Security Agency-which possesses only limited legal authority to spy on U.S. citizens-has built a surveillance network that covers more Americans' Internet communications than officials have publicly disclosed, current and former officials say.

The system has the capacity to reach roughly 75% of all U.S. Internet traffic in the hunt for foreign intelligence, including a wide array of communications by foreigners and Americans. In some cases, it retains the written content of emails sent between citizens within the U.S. and also filters domestic phone calls made with Internet technology, these people say.

The NSA's filtering, carried out with telecom companies, is designed to look for communications that either originate or end abroad, or are entirely foreign but happen to be passing through the U.S. But officials say the system's broad reach makes it more likely that purely domestic communications will be incidentally intercepted and collected in the hunt for foreign ones.

The programs, code-named Blarney, Fairview, Oakstar, Lithium and Stormbrew, among others, filter and gather information at major telecommunications companies. Blarney, for instance, was established with AT&T Inc., former officials say. AT&T declined to comment.

This filtering takes place at more than a dozen locations at major Internet junctions in the U.S., officials say. Previously, any NSA filtering of this kind was largely believed to be happening near points where undersea or other foreign cables enter the country.

Details of these surveillance programs were gathered from interviews with current and former intelligence and government officials and people from companies that help build or operate the systems, or provide data. Most have direct knowledge of the work.

The NSA defends its practices as legal and respectful of Americans' privacy. According to NSA spokeswoman Vanee Vines, if American communications are "incidentally collected during NSA's lawful signals intelligence activities," the agency follows "minimization procedures that are approved by the U.S. attorney general and designed to protect the privacy of United States persons."

As another U.S. official puts it, the NSA is "not wallowing willy-nilly" through Americans' idle online chatter. "We want high-grade ore."

To achieve that, the programs use complex algorithms that, in effect, operate like filters placed over a stream with holes designed to let certain pieces of information flow through. After the 2001 terrorist attacks, NSA widened the holes to capture more information when the government broadened its definition of what constitutes "reasonable" collection, according to a former top intelligence official.

The NSA's U.S. programs have been described in narrower terms in the documents released by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden. One, for instance, acquires Americans' phone records; another, called Prism, makes requests for stored data to Internet companies. By contrast, this set of programs shows the NSA has the capability to track almost anything that happens online, so long as it is covered by a broad court order.

The NSA programs are approved and overseen by the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. NSA is required to destroy information on Americans that doesn't fall under exceptions to the rule, including information that is relevant to foreign intelligence, encrypted, or evidence of a crime.

The NSA is focused on collecting foreign intelligence, but the streams of data it monitors include both foreign and domestic communications. Inevitably, officials say, some U.S. Internet communications are scanned and intercepted, including both "metadata" about communications, such as the "to" and "from" lines in an email, and the contents of the communications themselves.

Much, but not all, of the data is discarded, meaning some communications between Americans are stored in the NSA's databases, officials say. Some lawmakers and civil libertarians say that, given the volumes of data NSA is examining, privacy protections are insufficient.

Sen. Ron Wyden, an Oregon Democrat, in 2012 sought but failed to prohibit the agency from searching its databases for information on Americans without a warrant. He has also pushed intelligence agencies to detail how many Americans' communications have been collected and to explain whether purely domestic communications are retained in NSA's databanks. They have declined.

"Technology is moving us swiftly into a world where the only barriers to this kind of dragnet surveillance are the protections enshrined into law," Mr. Wyden says.

This month President Barack Obama proposed changes to NSA surveillance to improve oversight. Those proposed changes wouldn't alter the systems in the U.S. that NSA relies upon for some of its most sensitive surveillance.

The systems operate like this: The NSA asks telecom companies to send it various streams of Internet traffic it believes most likely to contain foreign intelligence. This is the first cut of the data.

These requests don't ask for all Internet traffic. Rather, they focus on certain areas of interest, according to a person familiar with the legal process. "It's still a large amount of data, but not everything in the world," this person says.

The second cut is done by NSA. It briefly copies the traffic and decides which communications to keep based on what it calls "strong selectors"-say, an email address, or a large block of computer addresses that correspond to an organization it is interested in. In making these decisions, the NSA can look at content of communications as well as information about who is sending the data.

One U.S. official says the agency doesn't itself "access" all the traffic within the surveillance system. The agency defines access as "things we actually touch," this person says, pointing out that the telecom companies do the first stage of filtering.

The surveillance system is built on relationships with telecommunications carriers that together cover about 75% of U.S. Internet communications. They must hand over what the NSA asks for under orders from the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. The firms search Internet traffic based on the NSA's criteria, current and former officials say.

Verizon Communications Inc., for example, has placed intercepts in the largest U.S. metropolitan areas, according to one person familiar with the technology. It isn't clear how much information these intercepts send to the NSA. A Verizon spokesman declined to comment.

Not all telecommunications providers handle the government demands the same way, says the person familiar with the legal process. According to a U.S. official, lawyers at telecom companies serve as checks on what the NSA receives. "The providers are independently deciding what would be responsive," the official says.

Lawyers for at least one major provider have taken the view that they will provide access only to "clearly foreign" streams of data-for example, ones involving connections to ISPs in, say, Mexico, according to the person familiar with the legal process. The complexities of Internet routing mean it isn't always easy to isolate foreign traffic, but the goal is "to prevent traffic from Kansas City to San Francisco from ending up" with the NSA, the person says.

At times, the NSA has asked for access to data streams that are more likely to include domestic communications, this person says, and "it has caused friction." This person added that government officials have said some providers do indeed comply with requests like this.

The person says talks between the government and different telecoms about what constitutes foreign communications have "been going on for some years," and that some in the industry believe the law is unclear on Internet traffic. "Somebody should enunciate a rule," this person says.

Intelligence officials and the White House argue NSA's surveillance provides early warnings of terror threats that don't respect geographic boundaries. "It's true we have significant capabilities," Mr. Obama said in his NSA remarks last week. "What's also true is we show a restraint that many governments around the world don't even think to do."

Mr. Obama and top intelligence officials say NSA's programs are overseen by all three branches of government, citing procedures approved by the secret surveillance court that require the NSA to eliminate "incidentally acquired" data on Americans. "If you say, 'We don't want the NSA to be scanning large amounts of traffic,' you're saying you don't want it to do its job," says one former official.

Blarney, Fairview, Oakstar, Lithium and Stormbrew were mentioned, but not fully explained, in documents released by Mr. Snowden. An NSA paper released this month mentioned several but didn't describe them beyond saying, "The government compels one or more providers to assist NSA with the collection of information responsive to the foreign intelligence need."

The system is built with gear made by Boeing Co.'s Narus subsidiary, which makes filtering technology, and Internet hardware manufacturers Cisco Systems Inc. and Juniper Networks Inc., among other companies, according to former intelligence officials and industry figures familiar with the equipment.

Narus didn't respond to requests for comment. Cisco and Juniper declined to comment.

The NSA started setting up Internet intercepts well before 2001, former intelligence officials say. Run by NSA's secretive Special Services Office, these types of programs were at first designed to intercept communications overseas through arrangements with foreign Internet providers, the former officials say. NSA still has such arrangements in many countries, particularly in the Middle East and Europe, the former officials say.

Within NSA, former officials say, intelligence officers joked that the Blarney intercept program with AT&T was named in homage to the NSA program Shamrock, which intercepted telegraphic messages into and out of the U.S. and was an inspiration for the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which created the secret national-security court and placed intelligence activities under its supervision.

Blarney was in use before the 2001 terror attacks, operating at or near key fiber-optic landing points in the U.S. to capture foreign communications coming in and out of the country. One example is an AT&T facility in San Francisco that was revealed in 2006 during the debate over warrantless wiretapping. A similar facility was built at an AT&T site in New Jersey, former officials say.

After the 2001 attacks, a former official says, these intercept systems were expanded to include key Internet networks within the U.S. through partnerships with U.S. Internet backbone providers. Amid fears of terrorist "sleeper cells" inside the U.S., the government under President George W. Bush also began redefining how much domestic data it could collect.

For the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, officials say, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and NSA arranged with Qwest Communications International Inc. to use intercept equipment for a period of less than six months around the time of the event. It monitored the content of all email and text communications in the Salt Lake City area.

At that point, the systems fed into the Bush administration's program of warrantless wiretapping, which circumvented the surveillance court on the authority of the president's power as commander in chief. The Bush administration came under criticism from lawmakers and civil libertarians for sidestepping court supervision.

The current legal backing for Blarney and its related programs stems from a section of a 2008 surveillance law. It permits the government, for foreign intelligence investigations, to snoop on foreigners "reasonably believed" to be outside the U.S.

Previously, the law had tighter standards. It allowed the government to spy on people if there were "probable cause" to believe they were an "agent of a foreign power."

NSA has discretion on setting its filters, and the system relies significantly on self-policing. This can result in improper collection that continues for years.

For example, a recent Snowden document showed that the surveillance court ruled that the NSA had set up an unconstitutional collection effort. Officials say it was an unintentional mistake made in 2008 when it set filters on programs like these that monitor Internet traffic; NSA uncovered the inappropriate filtering in 2011 and reported it.

"NSA's foreign intelligence collection activities are continually audited and overseen internally and externally," Ms. Vines says. "When we make a mistake in carrying out our foreign intelligence mission, we report the issue internally and to federal overseers and aggressively get to the bottom of it."

Another Snowden document describes the procedures NSA uses to protect American information that is retained. Any such information is "minimized," meaning that it is destroyed. The document highlights several exceptions, including encrypted communications and information of foreign intelligence significance.

Officials acknowledged some purely domestic communications are incidentally swept into the system. "We don't keep track of numbers of U.S. persons," a U.S. official says. "What we try to do is minimize any exposure."

When searching the data, intelligence officials say they are permitted to look only for information related to a "foreign intelligence interest." In practice, the NSA has latitude under that standard, and an American's communication could be read without a warrant, another U.S. official says.

Paul Kouroupas, a former executive at Global Crossing Ltd. and other telecom companies responsible for security and government affairs, says the checks and balances in the NSA programs depend on telecommunications companies and the government policing the system themselves. "There's technically and physically nothing preventing a much broader surveillance," he says.

An official at Global Crossing's parent, Level 3 Communications Inc., says the company complies with laws requiring it to assist government investigations and declined to disclose the assistance provided.

It is difficult to know how much domestic data NSA is inadvertently retaining. The filtering technology relies on algorithms to seek out valuable communications. A U.S. official says analysts guide the use of these algorithms to make them as precise as possible.
-Devlin Barrett contributed to this article.

0 コメント: