2013年10月2日水曜日

Benghazi Facility

ベンガジの大使館が、スパイ活動の拠点とのこと。
 米国の諜報機関はリビアのベンガジにある領事館の建物を、スパイ活動
の拠点としていた。リビア内務省からの情報。
 リビア政府との間では何の連絡もなく、大使自身が諜報機関職員だった。

ベンガジ米国領事館
・本部による反乱軍のために武器提供を含む援助の調整が任務。
・大使がシリア政府と戦うため、反乱軍を召集し、武装させた。
・領事館がCIA支部として、主要な諜報センタや反乱軍援助の計画センタ
 になり、トルコやサウジ、カタールと調整。
・反乱軍は、アルカイダを含むテロ集団で構成される。
・武器の多くはトルコへ搬送。
 トルコからシリアへ密入国。

トルコ軍は、シリア政府軍の軍用ヘリコプターをロケット砲で撃墜。
ロケット砲は、米軍が提供した武器との説がある。

ベンガジ惨事は、脆弱を知りながら放置した国務省の怠慢とのこと。
情報分析者もいなかったからと言う。
報道を見る限り、大使として出向したCIA職員が召集したテロ集団を完全
に掌握できず、取調べ中に強奪かもしれない。

米司法局は、FBIによるPaula Broadwellに対する違法捜査で、訴訟を
取下げとの報道もある。Paula Broadwellが主張したベンガジ情報に
報道が追いついてきたようだ。

米政府は、保全の面で報告書を記載し、米報道は、武器提供の面で記載
する。仲間が戦っているから、武器を提供する米国。
軍産複合体は、利益を上げるが、死亡者は増加。

集団的自衛権容認派は、仲間が戦っているのを見過ごせないとの主張が
多いが、素手で戦っているのに、銃を提供し、仲間を有利にすることが
本当に良いことなのだろうか。その判断は誰がするのか。
難しい問題。

リビア 反イスラム教動画で米大使死亡
Paula Broadwell Lover or Whistle-blower
IRS Scandal
Benghazi No Investigation


Benghazi Attack Was Cover For Al Qaeda Arms Deal


LIBYA Petraeus Mistress Reveals CIA Annex Had Prisoners & Maybe The Reason For Consulate Attack


---リビアのベンガジ 米国領事館が米国諜報本部に---
16.09.2013, 14:43
http://japanese.ruvr.ru/2013_09_16/121431168/

 米国の諜報機関はリビアのベンガジにある領事館の建物を、スパイ活動の拠点としていた。カタールの「アルジャジーラ」がリビア内務省からの情報として報じた。
 リビア政府との間では何の連絡もなく、大使自身が諜報機関職員だったという。
 2012年9月11日、映画「イノセンス・オブ・ムスリム」をめぐる暴動が世界で巻き起こる中、ベンガジ領事館は襲撃され、クリストファー・スティーヴンス大使と3名の米国人が死亡していた。


---米政府、9月11日の国外施設の警備強化を指示---
2013年 09月 11日 11:08 JST
http://jp.reuters.com/article/jpUSpolitics/idJPTYE98A02620130911

[ワシントン 10日 ロイター] 米ホワイトハウスは10日、米同時多発攻撃が起こった日(9月11日=9・11)を迎えるにあたり、当日の国外米関連施設の警備を強化するよう指示した。
 昨年の9月11日には、リビアのベンガジの米領事館が襲撃され、大使ら4人が死亡したことを踏まえた措置としている。
 ホワイトハウスは声明で「大統領の国家安全保障チームは、9・11関連の攻撃を防ぎ、国外の米国民および施設を確実に保護する措置を講じている」と表明した。


---Benghazi facility 'unlike any other in recent history'---
Newly released report presents more evidence of secret activities
Published: 09/17/2013 at 8:23 PM
http://www.wnd.com/2013/09/benghazi-facility-unlike-any-other-in-recent-history/

Benghazi Attacks : Investigative Update Interim Report on the Accountability Review Board

NEW YORK - The U.S. facility in Benghazi was unique in almost every aspect as far as security was concerned, according to the State Department’s Libya desk officer, Brian Papanu.

“Well, Benghazi was definitely unique in almost every - I can’t think of a mission similar to this ever, and definitely in recent history,” Papanu stated.

The diplomat’s quotes were contained in a newly released 100-page report on the Benghazi attack by the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee.

Informed Middle Eastern security officials, meanwhile, have told WND on multiple occasions that the Benghazi mission was a planning headquarters for coordinating aid, including weapons distribution, to jihadist-led rebels.

Regarding the unusual nature of the U.S. facility in Benghazi, the House report stated: “Documents and testimony obtained by the Committee during the course of its investigation show that the ad hoc facility in Benghazi, rather than being an example of expeditionary diplomacy, was instead an expedient way to maintain a diplomatic presence in a dangerous place.

Are President Obama’s actions surrounding the Benghazi disaster grounds for impeachment? Aaron Klein makes the case in “Impeachable Offenses: The Case to Remove Barack Obama from Office,” available now, autographed, at WND’s Superstore

“The State Department was operating a temporary residential facility in a violent and unstable environment without adequate U.S. and host nation security support.”

Lee Lohman, the executive director of the Near Eastern Affairs Bureau, further testified: [R]emember that Benghazi, I’m not sure that we - I’m trying to think back. I mean, we’ve evacuated from any number of places, but I’m not sure we’ve ever gone into something in such an expeditionary way as this by ourselves without having military along with us.”

The unusual lack of adequate security presents further evidence that secret activities took place inside the U.S. facility. Any large security presence would have drawn more attention to the shabby residential facility.

Perhaps even more perplexing than the lack of a significant U.S. security team in such a threat environment was the presence of the February 17 Brigade, which provided external security to the attacked Benghazi U.S. compound, including the villa where murdered Ambassador Chris Stevens lived when he was in Benghazi.

The February 17 Brigade is part of the al-Qaida-linked Ansar Al-Sharia, a militia that advocates the strict implementation of Islamic law in Libya and elsewhere and that took credit for previous attacks against other diplomatic posts in Benghazi.

Ansar al-Sharia initially used Internet forums and social media to claim responsibility for the Sept. 11, 2012, Benghazi attack. Later, a spokesman for the group denied it was behind the attack.

Witnesses told reporters they saw vehicles with the group’s logo at the scene and that gunmen fighting at the compound had stated they were part of Ansar al-Sharia.

Some witnesses said they saw Ahmed Abu Khattala, a commander of Ansar al-Sharia, leading the attack. Contacted by news media, Khattala denied that he was at the scene.

More evidence of ambassador’s secret activities

According to the Middle Eastern security sources who have spoken to WND, arming efforts at the U.S. facility shifted focus to aiding the insurgency targeting President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria after the fall of Libyan dictator Muammar Gadhafi.

Two weeks after the Sept. 11, 2012, Benghazi attack, WND broke the story that murdered U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens himself played a central role in arming rebels and recruiting jihadists to fight Assad, according to Egyptian security officials.

In November 2012, Middle Eastern security sources further described both the U.S. mission and nearby CIA annex in Benghazi as the main intelligence and planning center for U.S. aid to the rebels, which was being coordinated with Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

Many rebel fighters are openly members of terrorist organizations, including al-Qaida.

The information may help determine what motivated the deadly attacks in Benghazi.

In June, a Libyan weapons dealer from the February 17 Brigade - the group hired to provide security to the U.S. mission in Benghazi - told Reuters he has helped ship weapons from Benghazi to the rebels fighting in Syria.

The detailed account may provide more circumstantial evidence the U.S. Benghazi mission was secretly involved in procuring and shipping weapons to the Syrian opposition before the deadly attack last September that killed the U.S. ambassador and three other Americans.

In the interview with Reuters, Libyan warlord Abdul Basit Haroun declared he was behind some of the biggest shipments of weapons from Libya to Syria. Most of the weapons were sent to Turkey, where they were then smuggled into neighboring Syria, he said.

Haroun explained he sent a massive weapons shipment from the port in Benghazi in August 2012, days before the attack on the U.S. compound. The weapons were smuggled into Syria aboard a Libyan ship that landed in Turkey purportedly to deliver humanitarian aid.

Ismail Salabi, a commander of the February 17 Brigade, told Reuters that Haroun was a member of the Brigade until he quit to form his own brigade.

Coordinating with rebels

Haroun told Reuters he runs the weapons smuggling operation with an associate, who helps him coordinate about a dozen people in Libyan cities collecting weapons for Syria.

In May, WND reported the U.S. Benghazi compound was involved in weapons collection efforts.

In a largely unnoticed speech to a think tank seven months before the Benghazi attack, a top State Department official described an unprecedented multi-million-dollar U.S. effort to secure anti-aircraft weapons in Libya after the fall of Gadhafi’s regime.

The official, Andrew J. Shapiro, assistant secretary of state for the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, said U.S. experts were fully coordinating the collection efforts with the Libyan opposition.

He said the efforts were taking place in Benghazi, where a leading U.S. expert was deployed.

In January, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton confirmed the efforts when she told Congress the CIA was leading a “concerted effort to try to track down and find and recover … MANPADS” looted from Gadhafi’s stockpiles.

Haroun did not mention any U.S. involvement in his weapons dealings.

However, last March the New York Times reported the CIA had worked with rebel commanders to coordinate the shipment of arms to the Syrian rebels since early 2012.

Last year, Business Insider alleged a connection between Stevens and a reported September shipment of SA-7 MANPADS and rocket-propelled grenades from Benghazi to Syria through Turkey.

Syrian rebels then reportedly began shooting down Syrian military helicopters with SA-7s.

Stevens’ last meeting on the night of the Benghazi attack was with Turkish Consul General Ali Sait Akin.

One source told Fox News that Stevens was in Benghazi “to negotiate a weapons transfer in an effort to get SA-7 missiles out of the hands of Libya-based extremists.”

‘Largest weapons shipment’

Fox News may find another one of its exclusive reports vindicated.

In October 2012, Fox News reported the Libyan-flagged vessel Al Entisar, which means “The Victory,” was received in the Turkish port of Iskenderun, 35 miles from the Syrian border, just five days before Stevens was killed.

The shipment, disguised as humanitarian aid, was described as the largest consignment of weapons headed for Syria’s rebels.

Fox News reported the shipment “may have some link to the Sept. 11 terror attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi.”

That shipment seems to be the one described by Haroun in his Reuters article.

Both Haroun and his associate described an August 2012 shipment with weapons hidden among about 460 metric tons of aid destined for Syrian refugees.

A recent U.N. report appears to confirm that weapons were hidden in the Al Entisar.

A U.N. Panel found that the loading port for the shipment was Benghazi, that the exporter was “a relief organization based in Benghazi” and the consignee was the same Islamic foundation based in Turkey that Haroun told Reuters had helped with documentation.

With additional research by Joshua Klein.


--- Exclusive: US security flaws exposed in Libya---
Trevor Aaronson Last Modified: 04 Sep 2013 16:40
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/09/20139413431960231.html

Documents show State Department knew of security problems in Benghazi but failed to fix them.

The US Department of State has known for decades that inadequate security at embassies and consulates worldwide could lead to tragedy, but senior officials ignored the warnings and left some of America's most dangerous diplomatic posts vulnerable to attack, according to an internal government report obtained exclusively by Al Jazeera's Investigative Unit.

The report by  an independent panel of five security and intelligence experts  describes how the September 11, 2012, attack on the US Special Mission in Benghazi, Libya, which left Ambassador J Christopher Stevens and three other Americans dead, exploited the State Department's failure to address serious security concerns at diplomatic facilities in high-risk areas.

Among the most damning assessments, the panel concluded that the State Department's failure to identify worsening conditions in Libya and exemptions from security regulations at the US Special Mission contributed to the tragedy in Benghazi. Undersecretary for Management Patrick Kennedy approved using Benghazi as a temporary post despite its significant vulnerabilities, according to an internal State Department document included with the report.

The panel cataloged a series of failures by State Department officials to address security issues and concluded that many Foreign Service officers are unclear about who is in charge of security.

Among the problems Sullivan's panel identified in the report:

    The State Department's management of its security structure has led to blurred authority and a serious lack of accountability. The undersecretary for management oversees security issues while also handling many other responsibilities. A newly created undersecretary for diplomatic security would allow the State Department to better focus on security issues affecting diplomatic posts around the world, according to the report. Left unaddressed, the control problem "could contribute to future security management failures, such as those that occurred in Benghazi."

    The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, the State Department security arm created following the 1983 bombings of the US Embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut, does not have a review process in place to learn from previous security failures. Inexplicably, Diplomatic Security officials never conducted what is known as a "hot wash" debriefing of Benghazi survivors to learn from their experience.

    No risk management model exists to determine whether high-threat posts, such as the one in Benghazi, are necessary given the danger to US officials. Risk decisions are made based on "experience and intuition," not established professional guidelines.

    None of the five high-risk diplomatic facilities the panel visited in the Middle East and Africa had an intelligence analyst on staff, described as a "critical" need.

    Diplomatic security training is inadequate, with no designated facility available to train agents to work at high-risk diplomatic posts.

    Even low-risk diplomatic posts are vulnerable. The Obama administration, concerned about potential attacks, ordered the closure of diplomatic posts in the Middle East and North Africa in August 2013. Of the 19 posts closed, only four were designated as high threat.

Sullivan's panel noted that its findings and recommendations are not new to State Department officials. A 1999 report by government contractor Booz Allen Hamilton recommended similar reforms, including an undersecretary for security. Madeleine Albright, then the secretary of state, approved the recommendation - but it was never implemented. "This report," the panel wrote, "was largely ignored by the Department."

Even when the State Department has enacted security reforms, agency officials have failed to comply with them or otherwise have exempted themselves from the new standards, Sullivan's panel determined.

Following the 1983 Beirut bombings, for example, the State Department implemented building safety standards for missions in high-risk areas, which became known as Inman standards, developed by a review panel headed by Bobby R Inman, the former director of the National Security Agency.

"Thirty years later, neither the US Embassy chancery in Beirut nor a significant number of other US diplomatic facilities in areas designated as 'high threat' meet Inman standards," Sullivan's panel wrote.

Security problems at diplomatic posts aren't isolated, the panel said, pointing out that safety concerns can be found at US facilities worldwide. For decades, the State Department has failed to address these vulnerabilities, the panel said, suggesting that Benghazi was a tragedy that might have been avoided.

Security standards exempted

At best, security at the US Special Mission in Benghazi was porous. The mission took lease of a 13-acre walled compound on June 21, 2011, two months before the ouster of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and after the shuttering of the US Embassy in Tripoli due to increased fighting in the capital.

Although the State Department reopened the embassy on Sept. 22, 2011, the Special Mission in Benghazi remained open despite serious security concerns. In December 2011, Undersecretary for Management Kennedy approved a one-year extension of the Benghazi post.

A career diplomat, Kennedy was aware of the security problems in Benghazi. The number of Diplomatic Security officers there ranged from five to as few as one, and security was augmented by the February 17 Brigade, a ragtag group of Libyan militants who at the time of the 2012 attack were working under an expired contract and complaining about poor pay and long hours. In addition, the US Special Mission did not have adequate barriers to slow a ground assault.

"Benghazi has demonstrated yet again the vulnerability of US facilities in countries where there is a willingness to protect US interests, but very little capacity to do so," the panel wrote.

The Benghazi post's failure to meet security standards did not prevent its operation. State Department officials effectively waived the security requirements. For years, the State Department has fostered a culture of waiving such requirements when officials choose not to meet them.

"Waivers for not meeting security standards have become commonplace in the Department; however, without a risk management process to identify and implement alternate mitigating measures after a waiver has been given, Department employees, particularly those in high threat areas, could be exposed to an unacceptable level of risk," Sullivan's panel wrote.

The panel added: "It is unlikely that temporary facilities, in areas such as Benghazi, will ever meet Inman standards. The Department therefore identifies missions with special terminology to avoid its own high, but unattainable, standards and then approves waivers to circumvent those standards, thus exposing those serving under Chief of Mission authority to an unacceptable level of risk."

No 'ground truth'

In the six months leading up to the attack in Benghazi, the warning signs were ominous: security in the city had deteriorated and threats against Western officials were increasing.

From March through August 2012, 20 significant acts of violence occurred, including a homemade explosive device thrown over the wall of the US Special Mission and an attack on the Benghazi International Committee of the Red Cross with rocket-propelled grenades.

On the morning of Sept. 11, 2012, diplomatic security officers issued a report that described Libyan security forces as "too weak to keep the country secure."

Yet no one at the State Department connected the intelligence dots to offer concerns about worsening security in Benghazi. According to Sullivan's panel, this oversight occurred because the Benghazi facility did not have an intelligence analyst on site to determine the "ground truth."

Benghazi wasn't unique in this. Sullivan's panel visited high-risk embassies in Nairobi, Kenya; Juba, South Sudan; Cairo; Beirut; and Sanaa, Yemen. None had an intelligence analyst on staff.

By contrast, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the United Nations employ experienced intelligence analysts in country to identify security concerns from the ground.

Training problems

While documenting security problems, Sullivan's panel said that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, known as DS, is viewed as the "gold standard" among federal law enforcement and security officials.

The State Department's security arm protects 35,000 US employees worldwide, as well as 70,000 employee family members and up to 45,000 local civilian staff members.

Sullivan's panel viewed additional training of security agents as "critical" to addressing the problems identified in the report. But today the Bureau of Diplomatic Security is having difficulty handling its training load.

The reason: the State Department, unlike other agencies, does not have a designated training facility for security agents. The department is now trying to identify a site near Washington, D.C., on which to build a Foreign Affairs Security Training Center.

Until a center is built, the State Department must continue "begging hat-in-hand for use of others' facilities," the report stated.

"The establishment of such an integrated, state-of-the-art facility is a best practice adopted long ago by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Secret Service, and the Drug Enforcement Administration," the panel wrote.

Repeated security failures

For the State Department, Benghazi became the latest in a long string of security failures. From 1998 to 2012, 273 significant attacks against US diplomatic facilities and personnel occurred.

In 1998, concerned about increasing threats to the embassy in Kenya, Ambassador Prudence Bushnell and the US Department of Defence asked to be moved to a safer building. State Department officials denied the request, citing budgetary concerns.

On August 7, 1998, simultaneous truck bombs exploded at the United States embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, killing more than 250 people, including 12 Americans.

A State Department review after the attacks found that at least two-thirds of the 262 US diplomatic facilities were so vulnerable to attack that they needed to be rebuilt or relocated.

Ten years after the East Africa bombings, on September 16, 2008, in a diplomatic cable obtained by WikiLeaks, the regional security officer in Sanaa, Yemen, informed his counterparts in Washington about a threat that British officials had intercepted and forwarded.

The threat, written in Arabic, discussed a car bomb targeting American and British interests in Yemen.

The next day, at about 9:15 am, a vehicle with men dressed in military uniforms shot through the gate of the US Embassy in Sanaa and detonated a car bomb. A second car breached the security gates and also exploded.

An al-Qaeda-affiliated group claimed responsibility for the attack, which killed 18 people, including one American.

Four years later, Benghazi happened.

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